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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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JPRS-EER-92-096

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**Dogan Interviewed on National, Political Stands**

AU1507110992 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 9 Jul 92  
p 10

[Interview with Ahmed Dogan, leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, by Maria Aglikina; place and date not given: "Ahmed Dogan: I Am a Bulgarian Citizen of Turkish Origin, Which Means That My Nationality Is Turkish"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[Aglikina] Are you content with the role of a balancing force in parliament, or are you striving for more? As a matter of fact, you have lately been suspected of centrist inclinations.

[Dogan] I think you are drawing a line of semantic division between balancing power and centrist inclinations. These two concepts are actually related to each other. A party that tries to avoid extreme right-wing and left-wing trends in political life should by all means be guided by the programmatic principles of a centrist orientation. Any other option for playing the role of a balancing force is uncertain, especially if the balancing force exists as a purpose in itself.

[Aglikina] Is the collective specification of the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] a form of isolation?

[Dogan] If you mean our rank-and-file members and our constituents, I must tell you that we recently visited Pleven, where there are hardly any Turks. The hall where our meeting took place was full of people, and one-tenth of them were ethnic Turks. Our 500 members in Sofia are all pure-blooded Bulgarians, as a matter of fact.

[Aglikina] What is your own nationality?

[Dogan] I am a Bulgarian citizen of Turkish origin, which means that my nationality is Turkish.

[Aglikina] Where do you feel more like a Turk—in Bulgaria or in Turkey?

[Dogan] I have already asked myself this question. From a psychological point of view, an individual is not conscious of his ethnic identity as long as he meets no resistance. A Turk does not feel much of a Turk when he is in Turkey, but as soon as he feels a certain hostility in his environment, the question of an individual's ethnic consciousness is aroused, especially when its survival is at stake. In such a case, he naturally feels more like a Turk.

[Aglikina] The DPS appears as a sort of prompter in the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey. Is this obstructing the normal, natural dialogue between the two countries?

[Dogan] I do not agree with you on the term "prompter." The role of a balancing force, or of a key party, as it is called, which was assigned to us regarding certain questions, presumably placed us in this position, but I think

this is a secondary trait, which does not characterize the essence of our movement. [passage omitted]

[Aglikina] Are you willing to say something about "that notorious list"? Your name was mentioned in a highly topical connection.

[Dogan] What list are you referring to? There have been quite an number of lists lately.

[Aglikina] Well, I mean that one notorious list in particular. [List of Bulgarian intelligence personnel working abroad under diplomatic cover, which Foreign Minister Ganey and Dogan allegedly submitted to the Turkish Government]

[Dogan] My name is mentioned on all sorts of occasions.

[Aglikina] Does this give you any satisfaction?

[Dogan] Not particularly, especially not regarding the vulgar stage of politicial struggles where attempts to disgrace each other, combined with unhealthy leaders' ambitions and other such things, prevail.

[Aglikina] Do you regard the "notorious list" as part of the specific "cocktail" of intrigues and gossip you just mentioned?

[Dogan] The "notorious list" was certainly the product of this atmosphere. I think the question is very simple, and I am confident that things will be clarified one day. I regret that this question was so widely spread. From the very beginning, it was common knowledge that the list is totally worthless and nothing but an attempt to disgrace Foreign Minister Stoyan Ganey and me.

[Aglikina] How do you evaluate the changes in the Cabinet, and do you think such changes are necessary?

[Dogan] Every change may appear positive at first glance, especially when there are so many problems awaiting their solution. I think the present government is not at the level of parliament. The government should be our executive counterpart, but, unfortunately, the present composition of the Cabinet prevents it from playing this role. Political life itself will decide whether we need any further Cabinet changes.

[Aglikina] Why did you give up Ludzhev?

[Dogan] We have not given him up. It was a question of principle. Without our partner's consent, we could hardly raise questions related to the reshuffling of the Cabinet. I consider Ludzhev a competent man who is very much involved with the democratic processes, and I think he is as loyal to the Union of Democratic Forces as is necessary.

**Leadership Changes in National Police Organization**

92BA1035A Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK  
in Bulgarian 13 May 92 pp 1-2

[Unattributed article: "A Change in the Director of the Police"]

[Text] Colonel Milcho Bengarski submitted his resignation. Colonel Viktor Mikhaylov has been named in his place. Statements of Yordan Sokolov to a OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK reporter.

The Press Center of the National Police reports that, on the basis of a presidential decree, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Yordan Sokolov, named Col. Viktor Mikhaylov as Director of the National Police.

Viktor Mikhaylov was born on 22 February 1944 in Pancharevo. He graduated from the Legal Department of Sofia University.

He has worked in the agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs since 1968. He worked as a duty officer in the Sofia district administration of the transportation police. Subsequently, he passed through all stages of the police hierarchy as an operative worker in criminal affairs and has worked as a prosecutor for a very long time.

The presidential decree found Col. Mikhaylov at his post as head of the transportation police in the National Police Directorate.

Viktor Mikhaylov is an erudite jurist, with rich practical experience in police work, with businesslike and professional qualities that answer the high demands on the police and their leader.

The naming of Mikhaylov took place after the former director of the National Police, Col. Milcho Bengarski, submitted his resignation.

Bengarski was named head of the National Police on 3 April 1991 by a presidential decree. Before that, he was deputy director of the Capital Directorate of Internal Affairs.

Bengarski's motives, as he expressed them to journalists, are that the requirements for staff and structural changes in the Internal Affairs Ministry are not being fulfilled thoroughly and that the concrete actions in this direction are not in unison with the order of Minister Yordan Sokolov. Honest and good professionals are being discharged. According to Bengarski, the surprising thing is that weaker professionals, discharged from the Ministry of Internal Affairs for immoral actions and using their service positions for personal favor, are being named in their place. The discharged people do not have the opportunity to defend themselves before the corresponding commissions because, in general, they are not called upon to give an evaluation of their actions to them.

The fact of the resignation of Col. Bengarski is truly sad. Even the leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs cannot ignore that about which the former director of the National Police already is protesting. Moreover, in yesterday's letter, published in DUMA, Milcho Bengarski is even clearer than in his statements on the radio: "Again the police are a scapegoat for the unsuccessful members of this or that political force, again it is a stooge and means for solving problems, the appropriate place for the solution of which is the parliament, the Council of

Ministers, the oblast administrations, the city councils, and other civilized places and methods."

However, if with the change of the "watch" in the National Police it will be possible to overcome the serious conflicts, which also led to Bengarski's resignation, it will depend not only on the professionalism but also on real depolitization in the agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

#### **Bengarski Made a Belated Demonstration**

According to the minister of internal affairs, Milcho Bengarski proved to be unsuited for carrying out reform in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. "In solving basic problems of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Bengarski showed doubts, hesitation, and even opposition," Yordan Sokolov said yesterday in parliament before a reporter of OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK.

According to Sokolov, the retirement of Bengarski was a belated demonstration because, at the proposal of the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Council of Ministers proposed to the president to dismiss him as head of the National Police. This was done by presidential decree of 7 May.

#### **Military Prosecutor Discusses Crime, Corruption**

92BA1056A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian  
20 May 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Lilko Yotsov, deputy chief prosecutor of Bulgaria and prosecutor of the Armed Forces, by Emiliya Antova; place and date not given: "Who Is Who in the Military Prosecutor's Office"]

[Text] *The corruption and crime among military personnel will prove to be quite a lot greater than in other spheres.*

[Antova] Mr. Yotsov, with reference to an article published in our journal dealing with your personal property and with apartments you handed out, you sent a denial to the editors. Finally, how many apartments do you have, and what residences did you give out and to whom?

[Yotsov] I had an apartment, given to me by the Ministry of Defense, that I later replaced with an apartment from the Construction Corps. It is true that the new one is a better apartment. I bought it in 1988 at the prevailing price. I do not have another purchased residence in Sofia. Now, I wanted to be included in the "Rose Valley" ZhSK [housing construction cooperative], in order to buy an apartment for my daughter, but then I gave up the idea. It was only a study. As far as the other offer to participate in the "Proletary" apartment block is concerned, it was only an offer, which I did not confirm. I did not take the other two apartments for myself but for my colleagues—Lieutenant Colonel Dimitrov, from Pleven, and Major Evgeni Milkov, from Varna.

[Antova] You came to Sofia in 1987. Where did you work before that?

[Yotsov] I worked in Varna for approximately 10 years and in Pleven for about eight.

[Antova] Aha. Do you consider, Prosecutor Yotsov, that there has been corruption in the allocation of residences among the military?

[Yotsov] You see now, we are receiving signals of a different nature. Now I cannot answer you categorically. There may be cases. I need to check.... At one time, the serviceman did not have the right to purchase more than one residence from our fund, but, at the time of Dzhurov, this order was changed, and a lot of people acquired second and third apartments.... There is even talk of a military physician who purchased four: Two he left for his wives, from whom he was divorced; the third he bought for his daughter; and the fourth was for himself!

[Antova] All right, but have you not heard of any case of favor lately?

[Yotsov] I really do not know.... There is a lot of talk about the athletes. Apparently Bobi Grigorov (he was president of "Slaviya") took a second apartment from the Construction Corps.

[Antova] Mr. Yotsov, were there not cases in which "the party wet nurse" interfered crudely into your work, in order to predetermine one case or another?

[Yotsov] Yes, unquestionably. They ordered us....

[Antova] And what happened with the case concerning the death camps?

[Yotsov] Well, you see, we are a legal nation. There is legal prescription.

[Antova] I know, but some deputies assert that even now there are provisions in the Criminal Code according to which the most notorious murderers may be convicted. The assertions are from deputies who are jurists.

[Yotsov] I have doubt about their legal knowledge, especially in this area.... You have to make sense about this matter.

[Antova] Have you personally convicted a senior military officer who is now in prison?

[Yotsov] There was and there is. In Varna, I personally put the commander of Control of Motor Transport (KAT) into prison for corruption and theft.

[Antova] I am asking you about this on purpose. Do you know the chief of the Passport Service of the Varna airport, Marin Marinov?

[Yotsov] Yes, we are friends.

[Antova] Is it true that you blocked the investigation directed against him?

[Yotsov] The problem there is very delicate, and customs employees and a former intelligence agent, Misko Donski, are involved....

[Antova] Yes, but there was evidence of corruption against Marinov, and you know him very well. People from the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Varna told me that you interfered in order to hush up the investigation.

[Yotsov] No. An investigation has been conducted. The question is, who gave you the information?

[Antova] Did you see the case in Varna?

[Yotsov] No, no!

[Antova] Then what do you know about the case?

[Yotsov] Just that the complaints about Marinov were not substantial.... Well, perhaps there was some guilt. I do not deny it! In the customs house, they say about him: "He uncovered us, but he is a scoundrel, too!"

[Antova] That may well be the case... (L. Yotsov laughs)

[Yotsov] Well, he took some things from the ships. They gave him whiskey...but I do not know a customs agent or examining post (KPP) agent who will not take something.... Therefore, at one time we conducted a goods and materials investigation of them (a house search—author's note).

[Antova] And did you conduct such an investigation of Marinov?

[Yotsov] No, it was not done.

[Antova] Prosecutor Yotsov, what is the crime rate among the military personnel—for example, during the past year?

[Yotsov] The number is up and down but constant during the year. It is not true that we are concealing things. On average, there are approximately 2,500 cases per year. Last year I even surprised the former prosecutor, Martin Gunev. At that time, altogether about 2,500 people were detained in the country, and only 1,500 were by the Military Prosecutor's Office!

#### KNSB's Petkov Views Government's 'Isolation'

AU1407151592 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 8 Jul 92  
pp 1, 3

[Interview with Prof. Krustyu Petkov, chairman of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, by Sonya Gulubarova; place and date not given: "Executive Power Is in Total Isolation and Has Turned Its Back on the Program of the Union of Democratic Forces"]

[Text] [Gulubarova] Professor Petkov, can you at least tell us what is happening? Is there any major branch of industry that does not have something to protest about?

[Petkov] I would describe the situation as the beginning of chaos. A tidal wave of uncoordinated and uncontrolled protests and strikes is starting. The ninth wave may prove fatal for us and for the government.

[Gulubarova] When he left parliament yesterday, the prime minister said that the trade unions have no control over their memberships!

[Petkov] Surprisingly, this time he is right; we no longer have control. We are not in a position to do what we could do six months ago, or even a month ago—namely, to reach agreement and guarantee social peace. For seven months now, the mechanism of social partnership has been ignored by the government and replaced by a tactic of delaying negotiations. The government confronted the trade unions with the aim of isolating them from the reform. Now this tactic has rebounded on the aims and intentions of the government itself. The people have finally lost patience.

[Gulubarova] Is this why they are blocking the roads, launching attacks, declaring hunger strikes, and rushing around Sofia in ambulances with sirens sounding?

[Petkov] These are actions of desperation, of spontaneous protest, and of seeking to defend their rights by taking trade union matters into their own hands. However, the root causes of the chaos actually lie in the irresponsibility and incompetence of the executive power.

[Gulubarova] Does this mean that the government is not functioning?

[Petkov] Not at all. It is functioning, but its ideas and energies are chiefly wasted on repressions and crushing any opposition. This is done in a semisecret way, hidden from society. The attack on the trade unions and private business is aimed at destroying the only structures of national dimensions that have a pronounced critical attitude toward the fathers of the reform. If they fail to attain this goal (and it is unrealistic), they have an alternative in reserve—namely, to make the people believe that the trade unions, not the government, are responsible for the failure of the reform.

[Gulubarova] So they seek to cast the blame from the guilty to the innocent?

[Petkov] Exactly. However, the trade unions' demands have been clearly and explicitly published in the Memorandum of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] and the Podkrepia Labor Confederation. For this reason, the statement that the prime minister made yesterday is so helpless as to be ridiculous. It indicates that the government is cut off from reality and encapsulated in its own Cabinet problems; it shows the total isolation and self-isolation of the executive power from the other structures of society. It has opened fronts on all sides: Starting with the trade unions, it went on to attack private business and ended with attacking the church and the Holy Synod. Finally, it has come about that the people themselves are turning their backs on this government.

[Gulubarova] Do you want to say that the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] has exhausted itself?

[Petkov] This is the big question. I consider that the SDS still has potential, but it no longer lies so much in the abstract SDS idea as in the program with which the union won the elections last year. Unfortunately, the Cabinet and its doyen, Mr. Kostov, have turned their

backs on this program. We have been asserting for a long time that the economic and social sections of this program constitute a serious foundation for drafting a new, alternative policy for the reform. The present fathers of the monetary version of this program have fallen into a condition of intellectual and administrative insufficiency and must be replaced with new people.

[Gulubarova] Is there anyone who can carry all this out, Professor Petkov?

[Petkov] In the political sense, today there is no alternative. The SDS is squirming under the boot of the 39 [deputies who walked out of parliament last summer]; the Bulgarian Socialist Party has found itself in an impasse; and the Bulgarian Democratic Center has dissolved itself. However, I am convinced that such an alternative will appear, despite the present tension and chaos in the country. The KNSB is prepared to support such an alternative on purely practical considerations, to enable us at long last to start the reform in the right direction.

[Gulubarova] The KNSB and Podkrepia now seem to be working in tandem. Trenchev and you have been compared to Don Quixote and Sancho Panza.

[Petkov] Dr. Trenchev is no naive romantic, nor am I a loyal bearer of arms. We are not yet a duo, because the two trade union confederations maintain their differences. However, continuous consultations are taking place, and I neither deny this fact nor am bothered by it. It is not important how a top bureaucratic adviser assesses the drawing together of the two confederations' positions, but what is important is how the people accept our "union." They regard it with hope, or rather consider it their last hope. Private business and certain formations in the state sector are our close partners. Bilateral structures and contacts are being consolidated. I am sure that the union of labor and capital can attract reliable political partners, as happened in Singapore, for example.

[Gulubarova] Recently, the trade unions have been accused of engaging in subversive plotting....

[Petkov] We have dealt with completely prosaic and unpleasant issues: first, conducting negotiations in the National Council for Social Partnership; second, seeking solutions to the hundreds of conflicts throughout the country, holding meetings with strike committees from companies and industrial branches; and third, choosing a way to survive in conditions of the confiscation of trade union property and actual financial insolvency.

[Gulubarova] Have things gone this far?

[Petkov] Yes, but the Executive Council rejected the suggestion that we declare bankruptcy. It also categorically rejected the other alternative—namely, to seek credit from the state to enable us to continue to "exist." We reached a simple and nonstandard solution: to set our work on market principles. Some of the experts and the confederation's leadership team will return to their civilian professions, but they will continue to work for

the KNSB. We are developing paid consultational, information, and other work. We are starting to earn money again, both for the confederation and, at the same time, to maintain ourselves and our families.

[Gulubarova] But this is not normal trade unionism, is it?

[Petkov] Are repressions and confiscations normal practice? They are even confiscating the membership subscriptions we are receiving at the moment. When one adds the refusal to permit the extraordinary KNSB congress to increase the financing of the confederation, what other alternative is left for us?

It is important that we continue to work for the trade unions. It remains our duty to hold negotiations with the government, to maintain parallel statistics on prices and inflation, and to take part in drafting legislation. We will rely on the growing autonomy of the organizations. We face a difficult transitional period of adaptation to the new conditions, but we will survive.

[Gulubarova] Let us hope so! Let us return to the main subject: What will the protests and strikes lead to?

[Petkov] There are two possibilities: Either the local and branch conflicts will grow into a general strike (out of the trade unions' control), or we will suddenly start talks in the National Council for Social Partnership on one major issue—namely, the strikes and protest actions and the possibilities for satisfying the main demands. Unfortunately, the agreement in principle reached last week has now proved to be too late....

#### **Statute of Podkrea Labor Confederation**

92BA0878A Sofia PODKREPA in Bulgarian 15 Apr 92  
pp 3-4

[Statute of the Podkrea Labor Confederation, adopted on 22 March 1990 and amended and supplemented on 10 February 1992]

#### **[Text] We, free-thinking Bulgarian citizens,**

—With a view to the fundamental rights and needs of the people, stemming from their nature as human beings and the standards of civilized behavior, as adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

—Basing our requirements on the Bulgarian Constitution and the existing legislation, as well as on the Pact on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Helsinki, Madrid, and Vienna Accords, and Conventions 87, 98, and 111 of the ILO [International Labor Organization], to which Bulgaria is a signatory;

—In the belief that we can contribute to the real protection of our professional interests and creative intellectual toil through our conscientious, honest, legitimate, and constructive activities;

—Deeply convinced that it is only and exclusively through the conscious will of free citizens that the profound deformations in the economic, ecological,

spiritual and social areas, culture, and morality, accumulated after decades of totalitarian rule, can be eliminated and surmounted once and for all;

—Guided by the awareness of civil and human solidarity and sincerely resolved to contribute to the building of a just, humane, and civilized society, founded on the principles of democracy and pluralism,

#### **Have resolved to form the Podkrea Labor Confederation.**

### **CHAPTER 1**

#### **General Stipulations**

**Article 1.** The Podkrea Labor Confederation is a voluntary association of professional (trade union) organizations based on professional and territorial principles. These organizations consist of citizens united in the defense of their professional and social interests.

#### **Independence**

**Article 2.** The Podkrea Labor Confederation is independent of state and administrative bodies, employers, political parties, and public organizations.

#### **Object and Purpose**

**Article 3.** The target and object of activities of the Podkrea Labor Confederation are the defense of the rights, dignity, and professional and social interests of the members of the organization within the Confederation, through:

—Securing their rights in the areas of professional activities, wages, social conditions, and technical and labor safety;

—Protecting the health and the material, social, and cultural interests of its members and their families;

—Coordinating and protecting the interests of the working people and those of employers for the sake of the prosperity of the enterprises;

—Ensuring possibilities for upgrading the professional qualifications and retraining and trade union standards;

—Disseminating democratic ideas and strengthening confidence, mutual aid, and cohesion within society;

—Influencing the shaping of the socioeconomic policy of the state aimed at improving material conditions and an equitable distribution of the public product on the basis of the principles of social partnership.

#### **Tasks**

**Article 4.** The Podkrea Labor Confederation implements its tasks by:

1. Representing and defending its members in dealing with employers, authorities, and state administration agencies, as well as with public, political, and other organizations.

2. Participating in talks with employers for the conclusion of labor contracts and agreements.

3. Exercising trade union control over the condition of the technical basis and labor safety and protection. Inspecting jobs and recommending to its members that they not engage in labor activities in workplaces in which conditions do not meet accepted standards.
4. Acting as intermediary among members, employers, the state, and Bulgarian, foreign, and international physical and juridical persons.
5. Supervising the opening of a labor market and defending the value of the manpower in all sectors.
6. Providing specialized and other assistance to its members and organizations.
7. Developing trade union solidarity among the members of the confederation.
8. Providing material and moral assistance to its members.
9. Requesting employers to provide optimal conditions for the recreation of its members and ensuring that these requests are met.
10. Engaging in cultural-educational and philanthropic activities.
11. Studying and providing information to the public on living conditions and controlling the minimum social and living standards.
12. Undertaking actions to ensure the socially weak and their families, to meet their needs for housing and places in nurseries and kindergartens for their children, and to obtain aid from social and other funds for them.
13. Cooperating with the health-care authorities for the sake of improving health services and the health insurance of the citizens.
14. Ensuring that Bulgaria observe international agreements it has ratified and demanding that Bulgaria join other agreements.
15. Expressing views on problems of key importance, such as the distribution of the national income, capital investments, and social consumption funds, market availability, price setting, the amounts of wages, and other matters of vital importance to society.
16. Assisting in improving the state of the economy, culture, science, and education.
17. Publicly condemning and submitting suggestions and proposals relative to the life and health of the citizens and the ecological condition of the country.
18. Drafting and submitting plans concerning representation and participation in management and in social and labor legislation.
19. Engaging in extensive information activities and publishing books, pamphlets, bulletins, and periodicals.
20. Organizing activities, the revenues from which will be used for the implementation of specific tasks of the confederation based on the present statute.

21. Organizing and guiding actions of collective protest, including strikes.
22. Organizing and contributing to the implementation of tasks based on the statute and program.

#### **Juridical Person**

- Article 5.** (1) The Podkrepia Labor Confederation is a juridical person with headquarters in Sofia.
- (2) The name "Podkrepia" is part of the name of the confederation and of its member organizations.
- (3) The Podkrepia Labor Confederation has its own symbol, letterhead, and seal.
- (4) The use of the name, sign, letterhead, and seal or elements of the same is based on a regulation issued by the Confederation Council.

#### **Membership in International Trade Union Organizations**

**Article 6.** The Podkrepia Labor Confederation may be a member of international trade union organizations with similar objectives and tasks.

#### **Interaction With Other Organizations**

**Article 7.** The Podkrepia Labor Confederation may interact with organizations in the country and abroad, provided their objectives, tasks, and activities do not conflict with its statute and program. In such cases, the confederation retains its organizational and juridical autonomy.

#### **Participation in International Actions**

**Article 8.** The Podkrepia Labor Confederation may participate in international actions related to its activities.

#### **Activities in the Country and Abroad**

**Article 9.** The Podkrepia Labor Confederation operates throughout the territory of the country. Its activities are not limited to enterprises and establishments with the participation of foreign capital, or outside the country, inasmuch as the pertinent legislation does not stipulate otherwise.

#### **Representation**

**Article 10.** The Podkrepia Labor Confederation is represented by its president or an authorized member of the Confederation Council.

#### **Representation in Court**

**Article 11.** The Podkrepia Labor Confederation may defend its members—physical and juridical persons—in the case of labor disputes in court, as well as in other judicial actions, in accordance with current legislation.

## CHAPTER 2

### Membership: Rights and Obligations

#### Full Members of the Confederation

**Article 12.** Professional organizations-unions (regional and professional), federations, and national trade unions whose programs and structural documents do not violate the statute of the confederation may be full members of the Podkrea Labor Confederation.

#### Rights

**Article 13.** Full members of the Podkrea Labor Confederation have the following rights:

1. To participate in the overall activities of the confederation.
2. To participate in the formulation, discussion, and adoption of programmatic and structural documents.
3. To obtain current information on all decisions made by the confederation's administrative organs.
4. To obtain financial and organizational assistance from the confederation.
5. To participate cohesively in actions recommended by the confederation.
6. To withdraw from the confederation.

#### Obligations

**Article 14.** The full members of the confederation have the following obligations:

1. To observe the statute and implement the program of the confederation.
2. To implement the resolutions of the Confederation Council, applicable to interaction among members of the confederation and its relations with other organizations.
3. To assist in the implementation of the resolutions of the confederation authorities other than in the cases stipulated in the preceding item.
4. To make regular contributions from their financial revenue to the confederation.
5. To inform the leading confederation authorities of their activities.
6. Not to preach violence, militarism, racial, national, or religious hatred or discrimination, or any communist, fascist, or other totalitarian ideology in any form.

#### Associate Members of the Confederation

**Article 15.** (1) Organizations that are not political parties and movements but whose objectives and activities are similar to those of the confederation may become associate members of the Podkrea Labor Confederation.

(2) Associate members participate in the meetings of the Confederation Council as observers and with the right to a consultative vote.

(3) Associate members do not have to make withholdings from their fiscal revenues.

(4) Associate members pay for the services provided by the confederation in accordance with the procedure and method defined by the Confederation Council.

#### Procedure for the Acceptance of New Members

**Article 16.** (1) Organizations applying for membership in the confederation must register their petitions and their programmatic and structural documents with the Executive Council.

(2) The Executive Council will consider the submitted documents and submit a copy of them to the TsKPK [Central Control-Auditing Commission]. The decision of the Executive Council and the opinion of the TsKPK, together with the submitted documents, are submitted to the Confederation Council for a final decision.

#### Termination of Membership

**Article 17.** Membership in the Podkrea Labor Confederation may be terminated in the following cases:

1. Termination of the existence of the juridical person.
2. At the request of the full or associated member.
3. By expulsion.

#### Termination for Reasons of Liquidation

**Article 18.** Membership in the confederation is terminated with the termination of the existence of the juridical person. The body in charge of the liquidation informs the Confederation Council of the event. The Confederation Council passes a resolution regarding the disposal of the property.

#### Termination by Petition

**Article 19.** Membership in the confederation, under the stipulations of Article 17, Item 2, is terminated by submission of a written request to the Executive Council, accompanied by the minutes of the supreme leading body of the respective structure, certifying to the agreement of the membership. The termination of membership is enacted with the resolution of the Confederation Council or by a three-month notification.

#### Termination by Resolution of the Confederative Council

**Article 20.** Termination of membership under the conditions of Article 17, Item 3 takes place as a result of failure to contribute the membership dues for minor reasons over a period in excess of three months, as well as for actions or inactions that undermine the authority of the confederation or that are inconsistent with the statute and the general trade union program. Expulsion motions are submitted in writing to the Executive Council in accordance with the stipulated procedure for convening the Confederation Council by the interested member of the Confederation Council. The expulsion resolution must be passed by the Confederation Council on the basis of a qualified majority after a request to hear out the involved party. The involved member of the

confederation may appeal the resolution or expulsion to the TsKRK. The TsKRK may resubmit the matter for reconsideration by the Confederation Council. The affected member of the confederation may appeal to the congress for a final decision.

#### **Organization Membership**

**Article 21.** Organization membership as per Article 12 is based on the members' organizational documents (statutes).

#### **Individual Membership**

**Article 22.** (1) Any physical person 16 years old or older may be a member of a trade union section that is an organizational member of the Podkrea KT [Labor Confederation].

(2) Any individual member of Podkrea has the right to elect and be elected to the leading and control bodies of the Podkrea KT or those of the organization—professional or regional—of which he is a member. Restrictions are based exclusively on Article 67 of the statute.

#### **Establishment of Individual Membership**

**Article 23.** Membership of a physical person in the section is established as of the moment of:

- The establishment of the section and designation of the charter members;
- The date of submission of a written request to the section's leadership, if it is not rejected within a period of seven days. By petition of the candidate the general (delegate) assembly of the section may review the application.

#### **Termination of Individual Membership**

**Article 24.** (1) Membership of a physical person in a section is terminated in the following cases:

1. Resignation by written request.
2. Expulsion.
3. Death.

#### **Sanctions**

**Article 25.** (1) The following sanctions may be imposed for violating the fundamental principles and objectives of the Podkrea KT, as stipulated in the statute and the program, as well as for actions or inactions that defame the reputation and name of the confederation, the general assembly, or the assembly of representatives:

- Warning.
- Expulsion.

(2) A member of the leading or control organ of the confederation who has been sentenced by a court for a premeditated felony, thus defaming the reputation of the confederation, may be expelled by decision of the Confederation Council.

#### **Honorary Members**

**Article 26.** Foreign trade union organizations or foreign citizens who share the objectives and ideals of the confederation may be members of the Podkrea Labor Confederation, with the status of honorary members. They may not be elected members of leading, executive, or control organs of the confederation.

### **CHAPTER 3**

#### **Structure**

#### **Principles**

**Article 27.** (1) The organizational structure of the confederation is based on the principle of free confederation of autonomous professional organizations and regional associations.

(2) The regional associations and professional organizations are based on the principles of democracy, decentralization, and interaction of ties and resources.

(3) The structural units of the confederation are built mandatorily on the professional (branch) and territorial principles.

#### **Members of the Podkrea KT**

**Article 28.** The Podkrea Labor Confederation consists of:

1. Structures based on the professional principle:
  - Federations [federatsii];
  - National trade unions [natsionalni regionalni suyuzi];
  - Unions [suyuzi].
2. Structures based on the territorial principle:
  - Trade union regional association [sindikalni regionalni suyuzi].

#### **Federations, National Trade Unions, and Unions**

**Article 29.** (1) The federation consists of trade unions based on a departmental and regional principle.

(2) The national trade unions are based on a branch and regional principle.

#### **Trade Union Regional Association**

**Article 30.** (1) The trade union regional association is an association of regional trade unions and township trade unions. Autonomous sections not belonging to a corresponding regional trade union may participate in it as members.

(2) In the territory of the township in which the trade union regional association is located, it also performs the functions of a township trade union.

#### **Regional Trade Union**

**Article 31.** The regional trade union consists of sections based on the departmental and branch principle.

### Township Trade Union

**Article 32.** The township trade union consists of sections organized on township territory.

### Organization Statutes

**Article 33.** All issues pertinent to the activities of federations, national trade unions, and national, regional, and township unions must be resolved on the basis of their structural documents (statutes).

### Trade Union Section

**Article 34.** (1) The trade union section is the basic structural unit at the place of work. According to the specific nature of the work, trade union groups may be set up within the section. The organization of more than one section of the Podkrepia KT under the same employer (enterprise) is allowed.

(2) The trade union section must be legitimized by the trade union regional association and the trade union organizations (federations, national trade unions, and unions) of which it is a member and to which it pays regular membership dues.

(3) Independent members, pensioners, students, and unemployed people may unite within trade union sections on the basis of the territorial principle.

### Confederation Organs

#### Supreme Organ

**Article 35.** (1) The congress, which convenes once every two years, is the supreme confederation organ.

(2) The congress opens its proceedings if delegates of more than one-half of the collective members and no less than two-thirds of delegated representatives are present.

(3) The congress can pass decisions in the presence of more than one-half of registered delegates by open vote and simple majority.

(4) A congress may pass some decisions by secret vote or by qualified majority if so requested by 10 percent of the delegates.

#### The Congress

##### Article 36. The Congress

(1) Adopts the statute and statutory amendments by a qualified majority (two-thirds) of attending delegates by an open vote.

(2) Approves the general program of the confederation by a qualified majority and by open vote.

(3) Sets a quota for representation of the unions (regional and trade), federations, and national trade unions represented in the Confederation Council.

(4) Also elects a team consisting of a president and a vice president by a simple majority (one-half plus one vote) of those present, by secret balloting and with a mandate valid until the next regular Congress. If neither team obtains the necessary number of votes, a second round of

elections is held with secret voting and a simple majority; the two teams that obtained the highest number of votes in the first round participate in the second round.

(5) The elected team submits a list of the other members of the Executive Council—the confederation secretaries. This list is voted individually, by open balloting and a simple majority. If a member on the suggested ticket is not elected he is replaced by another candidate submitted by the team. This motion is voted upon in accordance with this paragraph.

(6) Elects a team consisting of a chairman and a deputy chairman of the Central Control-Auditing Commission (TsKPK) as per Paragraph 4.

(7) Elects five TsKPK members as per Paragraph 5.

(8) Accepts the report submitted by the confederation president.

(9) Accepts the TsKPK report.

(10) Makes decisions on all issues pertaining to the overall activities of the confederation.

(11) Sets the minimal amount of membership dues for physical persons.

(12) Adopts a system for the allocation of membership dues to the confederation, the trade union regional associations, the federations, and the national trade unions.

(13) Sets the amount to be withheld from membership dues for the strike fund.

#### The Confederation Council

**Article 37.** (1) The Confederation Council, which is an open structure, is the highest authority of the confederation between congresses. It consists of named authorized representatives of federations, unions, and national trade unions, and members of the Executive Council.

(2) The Confederation Council is based on the number of organization members and the quotas set as per Article 36, Paragraph 3.

(3) The meetings of the Confederation Council must be held regularly in the presence of two-thirds of its members.

#### Confederation Council Rights

##### Article 38. The Confederation Council

(1) Drafts a regulation on its activities.

(2) Hears a report on the activities of the Executive Council at each session.

(3) Coordinates the activities of its members.

(4) Supplies information to its members on the activities of the entire confederation and processes information received from them.

- (5) Considers and approves requests for membership in the confederation as per Article 16
- (6) Approves the confederation budget
- (7) Provides conditions for the organizational strengthening of the confederation
- (8) Publishes an information bulletin on confederation activities.
- (9) Organizes bilateral and multilateral meetings with other trade union organizations within the country and abroad.
- (10) Has the right to dismiss a member of the Executive Council who has committed proven violations in the sense of Article 25 of the statute or who fails to perform official duties. Such resolutions are passed by simple majority and secret balloting
- (11) Approves the replacement of a member of the Executive Council who has remained absent over an extensive period of time for objective reasons, for the duration of his absence. Such approvals are based on simple majority voting and secret balloting.
- (12) Fills vacancies in the Executive Council. Such elections are based on a simple majority with secret balloting.
- (13) Passes resolutions on actions, including strikes on a national scale, and recommends them to its members.
- (14) Sets the procedure for summoning, organizing, and holding regular congresses
- (15) A decision to hold an extraordinary congress may be made by the Confederation Council on the basis of a written request made by one-fifth of confederation members, submitted to the Executive Council, as well as at the request of the TsKPK.

#### **Responsibility**

**Article 39.** The Confederation Council or individuals authorized by it must take steps in seeking property or penal liability. Such responsibility is assumed by all members of the Confederation Council concerning any action or inaction that may constitute a violation of the statute and the joint trade union program

#### **Convening the Confederation Council**

**Article 40.** (1) The Confederation Council holds regular meetings at least once every three months.

(2) The Confederation Council may be summoned to an extraordinary meeting at the initiative of the president, the Executive Council, or the Auditing Commission, or by request of one-tenth of the members of the Confederation Council.

#### **The Executive Council**

**Article 41.** The Executive Council is a permanent collective body that directs and organizes the overall activities

of the confederation between Confederation Council meetings. It consists of a president, a vice president, and confederation secretaries

#### **Rights and Obligations**

##### **Article 42. The Executive Council**

- (1) Executes the resolutions of the congress and the Confederation Council
- (2) Prepares for and convenes the meetings of the Confederation Council and appoints the chair
- (3) Makes decisions on current issues pertaining to the activities of the confederation. The resolutions of the Executive Council are passed by a simple majority of its members and open balloting
- (4) Formulates the draft budget of the confederation
- (5) Drafts and ratifies the table of organization of the confederation
- (6) Drafts an information bulletin on its activities and informs its members of it
- (7) Drafts a regulation on its activities
- (8) The rights and obligations of the Executive Council include the rights and obligations of its members

#### **The President**

**Article 43.** (1) The president of the confederation is elected by the congress with a mandate valid until the next regular congress

- (2) The president has representative functions and expresses the will of the Executive Council and the Confederation Council
- (3) The president submits to the congress the number, functions, and candidacies of confederation secretaries
- (4) The president signs the documents related to the activities of the confederation
- (5) The president convenes and chairs the meetings of the Executive Council
- (6) The president may summon and direct an Extraordinary Confederation Council
- (7) The president reports the activities of the Executive Council to the Confederation Council and the congress
- (8) The president has the rights and the responsibilities stipulated in Article 39

#### **The Vice President**

**Article 44.** (1) The confederation's vice president is elected by the congress with a mandate that expires at the next regular congress

- (2) In the absence of the president or as instructed by him, the vice president assumes the rights and obligations as per the preceding article
- (3) The vice president has the rights and responsibilities as per Article 39

### Confederation Secretaries

#### Article 45. The Confederation Secretaries:

- Are members of the Executive Council and the Confederation Council, with voting rights;
- Organize and are responsible for the activities of the departments they head;
- Submit to the Executive Council for their ratification the structures, the tables of organization, and the budgets of their departments;
- Report on their activities to the Confederation Council if so requested by any one of its members;
- Have the rights and obligations as per Article 39.

### Control Organs

#### Central Control-Auditing Commission (TsKRK)

**Article 46.** (1) The TsKRK, which, together with the KRK [Control-Auditing Commission], controls and audits the activities of the members of the confederation, is the supreme control body of the confederation.

(2) The TsKRK consists of a chairman, a deputy chairman, and five members elected by the Congress of the Podkrea KT as per Article 36, Paragraphs 4 and 5.

(3) The TsKRK members may not be elected or appointed to leading organs of the confederation. However, they may be elected congress delegates.

(4) The TsKRK may convene the Confederation Council and the Executive Council to extraordinary sessions.

(5) The TsKRK may convene an extraordinary congress by decision of the regular or extraordinary national conference of the KRK in accordance with Article 38, Paragraph 15.

(6) The TsKRK has its own budget, which must be approved by the Confederation Council.

(7) The TsKRK members have the rights and responsibilities as per Article 39.

### Control Activities

**Article 47.** (1) The TsKRK provides methodical assistance to the Control-Auditing Commissions, the Confederation Council, the Executive Council, and the control bodies in determining whether labor legislation is consistent with the statute of the confederation, the resolutions of the national conferences and the congress, and the current legislation.

(2) The TsKRK may exercise preliminary, preventive, and subsequent control over the activities of the organizations accepted within the structures of the Podkrea KT.

(3) The stipulations of the TsKRK are mandatory for all subordinate units of the Podkrea KT, unless they are appealed within one week to an arbitration commission established by the Confederation Council.

(4) If so requested by the Executive Council, the TsKRK supervises and audits the activities of the economic units formed by the confederation.

(5) Together with the KRK of the respective structure, the TsKRK supervises and audits the activities of economic units set up by the members of the confederation, with the exception of those stipulated in Paragraph 4.

### Control-Auditing Commissions

**Article 48.** The supreme body of each structure within the Podkrea Labor Confederation elects a KRK, the task of which is to supervise and audit the activities of the executive and leading organs of the respective structures.

### KRK National Conferences

**Article 49.** (1) The TsKRK and the KRK hold their regular national conferences twice each calendar year. The chairmen of the KRK of the federations, national trade unions, and associations must be present at such conferences.

(2) Extraordinary national conferences of the TsKRK and the KRK are convened at the request of one-tenth of the KRK of the organizations or by decision of the TsKRK.

(3) The National Conference of the TsKRK and the KRK adopts a regulation governing its joint activities, which may not violate the stipulations of the present statute and the joint trade union program.

### KRK Membership

**Article 50.** (1) The KRK consists of between one and three members in the sections, regional trade unions, and regional trade union associations.

(2) A KRK of a national trade union or a federation consists of five members.

### KRK Name

**Article 51.** A KRK is named after the structure that elects it.

### Replacing a KRK Member

**Article 52.** (1) A KRK may appoint a substitute for a member who has been absent for more than three months.

(2) A KRK may dismiss any one of its members who has committed a violation as defined by Article 25 of the statute.

### KRK Budget

**Article 53.** A KRK submits the required annual draft budget for approval by the body that sets the budget for the respective structure.

**CHAPTER 4****Income and Property****Income**

**Article 54.** The income of the confederation and its member organizations comes from:

1. Membership dues.
2. Voluntary contributions, donations, and bequests by physical and juridical persons in the country and abroad.
3. Income from property.
4. Income from cultural, sports, and other activities, including economic and trade activities.

**Property**

**Article 55.** (1) The Podkrepia Labor Confederation owns movable and real estate, cash, and securities.

(2) If necessary, the Podkrepia Labor Confederation may establish and participate in economic and commercial structures.

**Expenditure of Funds**

**Article 56.** Funds are expended for the organizational, social, and cultural-educational activities of the confederation, as well as for activities conducted in accordance with the statute.

**Budget**

**Article 57.** (1) The confederation budget for the respective calendar year is drafted and submitted by the Executive Council. Its ratification is based on a resolution passed by the Confederation Council.

(2) Budget amendments are made in accordance with the stipulations of the preceding paragraph.

**Financial Activity Accountability**

**Article 58.** Financial activities are reported periodically to the Confederation Council.

**Amount of Withholdings**

**Article 59.** (1) The congress determines the amount to be withheld from the financial contributions made by the members of the confederation. In the period between two congresses, the Confederation Council may change the amount of withholdings. Such decisions are made by a qualified majority of three-quarters of the organizations attending the session.

(2) Regional trade unions and professional organizations (federations, national trade unions, and associations) establish a strike fund in the amount determined by the congress.

**Collection and Expenditure Procedures**

**Article 60.** The order and means of collecting, spending, and accounting financial funds are based on a regulation approved by the Confederation Council.

**Labor Remunerations**

**Article 61.** (1) The remuneration of members of the Executive Council is paid out of the budget in amounts defined by the Confederation Council.

(2) The remuneration of staff specialists and experts assigned to the Executive Council as well as the honoraria of individuals who are members of the expert commissions are paid out of the budget in amounts defined by the Executive Council.

**Disposal of Property**

**Article 62.** The property (capital assets) of the confederation may be sold by decision of the Confederation Council.

**Bank Accounts**

**Article 63.** The confederation may have accounts in banks, savings banks, and other financial institutions, as allowed by law, and insure its property. The same applies to its collective members.

**Document Processing**

**Article 64.** All documents of a proprietary nature must be signed by the president or by another person authorized by the Executive Council.

**CHAPTER 5****Expert Commissions**

**Article 65.** (1) Temporary or permanent commissions of experts are set up under the Executive Council, the Confederation Council, and the TsKPK, if deemed necessary.

(2) Expert commissions are set up to assist the respective leading authorities of the confederation in an advisory capacity.

(3) The structure of the expert commissions and the principles and means of their activities, as well as their financial and technical support, are defined by the Executive Council and the TsKPK. Specialists who are not members of the confederation may be hired as members of such expert commissions.

**Publishing Activities**

**Article 66.** The Podkrepia Confederation may also have its own information facilities. The status of such information facilities is defined by the leading organs of the confederation.

**CHAPTER 6****Concluding Stipulations****Restrictions Governing Election to Leading and Control Organs**

**Article 67.** (1) Individuals who are members of political movements or parties may not be elected members of the leading and supervisory authorities of the Podkrepia Labor Confederation or of any one of its structures.

(2) An individual may not hold more than one elective or appointed position at the same time in the organs of the confederation.

(3) Leading positions in the confederation organs may not be held by members of administrative and directors' councils, employers or their deputies, or members of the executive, judiciary, and legislative branches.

**Authorizations of the Confederation Council According to the Statute**

**Article 68.** The Confederation Council has the right to amend and supplement the articles of the Statute of the Confederation that conflict with national legislation, should this become necessary. Such amendments require a qualified two-thirds majority.

**Structural Changes**

**Article 69.** The Federative Council has the right to make the regional division of the organization consistent with the territorial-administrative division of the country should it deem this to be expedient. Such changes require a qualified two-thirds majority.

**Confederation Council Decisions Regarding Unresolved Issues**

**Article 70.** All unresolved organizational and property issues included in this statute must be resolved by decision of the Confederation Council insofar as they have not been regulated by existing legislation.

**Possibility of Disbanding the Confederation**

**Article 71.** The Podkrepa Labor Confederation must be disbanded by a resolution of the congress if it is passed by a two-thirds majority of the delegates by open vote.

Amendments and supplements to the present statute were adopted at the Second Regular Congress of the Podkrepa KT, held between 8 and 12 February 1992 in Sofia.

**Resolution of the Second Regular Congress of the Podkrepa KT on Deleting Article 67, Paragraph 2 of the Confederation's Statute**

Taking into consideration the unstable balance of political forces at present and the real threat of restoration, and aware of the prevailing mood of the hundreds of thousands of members of the Podkrepa KT, and, at the same time, taking into consideration the democratic requirements of the world trade union community, the Second Regular Congress of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation has:

**Resolved:**

To temporarily restrict the election to leading positions at all levels of the confederation of individuals who have held leading elective positions in the BCP/BSP [Bulgarian Communist Party/Bulgarian Socialist Party] or worked as full-time personnel in the DKMS/BDM [Dimitrov Communist Youth Union/Bulgarian Democratic Youth], the BPS/KNSB [Bulgarian Trade Unions/Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria], the BZNS/BZNS-United [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union/Bulgarian National Agrarian Union-United], or the Active Fighters Against Fascism and Capitalism, or as full-time or supernumerary associates of the repressive apparatus, or participated in the revival process.

The present resolution was passed by a vote of 537 "for," 12 "against," and 20 "abstaining."

## Slovaks Comment on Their Predicament

### Havel Must Go

92CH06974 Bratislava PR AVDA in Slovak 15 Jun 92  
p 2

[Commentary by Peter Holka: "Obstacle Named Havel"]

[Text] No, my friends, this time I do not have in mind Havel's jump required of race horses at the Great Pardubice event but rather the person of President Vaclav Havel. For everything now suggests that his stellar time has ended, only he does not want to admit it to himself. From the human point of view I understand him, after all, for more than two years he was basking in the sun of success and acclamation from all corners of the world to the point, it seems, that he has succumbed to his own greatness and decided that he is not only the best living playwright but also the best living president. Let us just recall the carload of prizes, degrees, decorations, and other awards that even such a collector as Brezhnev would be proud of.

To us, the rank-and-file citizens, he was telling from Lany and other preelection niches that he really is not that eager to be the president, that it actually does not matter to him whether he sits in the Castle [Hrad] or in Hradecek; he only wants to promote certain values. Let us look closer at these values and let us assume that they definitely include democracy and constitutionality. Because Vlaclav Havel knows how to talk very nicely about democracy and constitutionality. But what about follow-up actions? Take the one which ought to have followed when the federal parliament rejected the president's draft legislation to strengthen his powers. A person professing adherence to democratic principles should—well, step down. But let us take it as reflecting that the president, just as all of us who had not emigrated beyond the horizons of everyday life, lived for many, many years in totality and is merely learning about democracy.

Vaclav Havel at his first inauguration indeed talked about his not desiring to be president but rather merely leading our citizens to free elections. It seems to me he has led them there two times already—and, after a long and agonizing deliberation, decided to run for the third time. It has only one catch—but a very big one. It is that his candidacy is one of the unsurmountable obstacles in the negotiation between the victorious parties and movements. Even without the negotiators everyone who can count to 75 sees clearly that the Slovak part of the Federal Assembly's House of Nations will not vote for him under any constitutional circumstances. There the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] holds 33 seats and the Slovak National Party [SNS] holds nine. Even if the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] should turn collaborationist and support Havel's candidacy, it will not be enough.

Yet Havel insists on being a presidential candidate even though he wants to promote values such as democracy

and constitutionality in politics. But elections are the supreme democratic institution. Can he ignore them just because he wants to be president, by hook or by crook?

### Referendum Needed

92CH0697B Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 18 Jun 92  
p 5

[Commentary by writer Pavel Vilikovsky: "Not Voting for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia"]

[Text] Some time ago when Great Britain had a Labour government I used to see in London streets cars with a sticker in the rear window: "Don't blame me. I voted Conservative." Now I read in the press various comments in which HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] voters express their deep concern over the fate of the common state and HZDS conduct in the current negotiations. I am tempted to tell these dumbfounded voters: "Don't blame me. I did not vote HZDS." But the matter is far too serious to dismiss by a sticker slogan.

HZDS has won the elections and is about to carry out its election program which among other things included these steps: proclaiming sovereignty of the Slovak Republic, adoption of a constitution, measures to obtain the status of a subject under international law, and calling a referendum on sovereignty and a new arrangement of relations with the Czech Republic. The program does not talk of a breakup of the common state, and given the chosen succession of steps it does not even have to. It will come somehow by itself. It is natural that a victorious movement strives to carry out its program. The common state, however, as suggested already by the name, has resulted from the will of at least two partners and its form is a matter of mutual agreement. Even though HZDS professes to lack mandate to tear the state apart, its actions practically lead to this effect. These steps received the mandate of 37 percent of the Slovak Republic's voters (judging from the reactions, by many unknowingly), and if we add to them the 8 per cent of those voting for SNS which had the independent state in its program, there still remains 55 percent, that is the majority of the voters, who have a right to take a stand on an act of such gravity as the breakup of the state before steps are taken to carry it out—no matter under what guise.

I feel I am a citizen of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and regard it as my fatherland. I may, however unwillingly, reconcile myself even to its breakup, provided that this is clearly and indisputably expressed as the wish of the majority of citizens of one or the other republic. Therefore the referendum must precede all the other steps whether following from the HZDS program or its strategic-tactical plans.

### Citizens Must Speak Up

92CH0697C Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 17 Jun 92  
p 4

[Article by "pag": "Let Us Tell Our Politicians"]

[Text] At a time when the future existence or nonexistence of the Czech-Slovak common home is at stake politicians are apt to resort to means which are not far from dissembling or scare tactics. One such bugbear is the specter of succession.

Despite the intimidating foreign word succession is something each of us will encounter in life at least once, if only in a certain sense in a purchase (sale) or involving inheritance.

Succession is a transfer of rights and obligations, in other words, legal succession. Following a person's death part of his rights and obligations may expire because they were tied exclusively to his person, but another part passes on to the inheritors. If there is a single heir the situation is by no means as complicated as when quarreling siblings begin to haggle over the property.

Believe it or not, the same applies also to states, albeit in a different form. States too are born and die; from our history we ought to remember the death of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy following which were born a number of new states, among them also Czechoslovakia (or was it Czech-Slovakia?). In any event this newborn of that time is presently undergoing throes and at this moment no one knows for sure whether they will be fatal.

A state can cease to exist by partition which we call dismemberment. This is precisely what happened in the case of Austria-Hungary. On the "decedent's" territory new states emerge which must in some fashion share in the rights and obligations of their predecessor. In our case this could be done either by both republics opting out of the existing federation (on the basis of a referendum), or by an effective cessation of the federation's governmental powers while preserving the governmental powers of the republics (which may happen in the dickering of political representatives if by 5 October they fail either to form a government or bodies of the Federal Assembly, or to elect a president).

A fundamentally different case is the birth of a state through separation, that is, secession. At one time five Balkan states originated by separating themselves from the Turkish empire. Bangladesh by separating from Pakistan. In such cases always only one new state emerges (albeit gradually), while the original state continues to exist on the reduced territory. This possibility too is not to be excluded if in our case one of the republics decided (in a referendum) to opt out of the common union while the other insisted on remaining in the union. Even if alone. Let us not be confused by calling ourselves the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Switzerland calls itself officially Confederatio Helvetica even though it is a federation; the former German Democratic Republic bore its name proudly even though it was not in the least democratic. A state's name plays a much lesser role than we would like to ascribe to it.

After the emergence of the new state by separation the original state remains a recognized member of international organizations, party to agreements it had signed, and has a more or less undisturbed use of all its embassies and other representations abroad, but for instance also of its naval fleet, foreign currency reserves, state

archives, and the like. The new state begins so to speak on a green meadow. For this reason too it is very important haggling over when in our case a referendum may eventually be called, whether simultaneously in both republics or on different dates, or in one republic only. And most assuredly important is the question to which the citizens would be asked to respond in it.

Should the referendum decide on continuing the federation without interruption, it would of course mean that nothing happens. But should it come to ending it, it will be of extraordinary importance whether it ended by dissolution or by secession of one of the republics.

Transfers of rights and obligations where there are heirs as physical persons are in each civilized country regulated rather precisely by domestic law, with an independent court watching over compliance with it. But international law has a much looser form and moreover the international community is not very well equipped to play the role of a judge or policeman. The new Yugoslavia as a Serbian-Montenegrin federation could rather easily become successor to the former SFRY. Yet its position among other states does not meet the requirements. Simply because the new Yugoslavia is not willing (and perhaps not even able) to observe obligations required of civilized countries it may not have its rights awarded either. And the same applies also the other way around. When transferring the rights and obligations of a defunct state to its successors the "heirs" may not be positioned equally. Czech-Slovakia has various obligations and debts in the world. In an eventual breakup it will be decisive who and to what extent will be able to meet these obligations. He will then be the one to whom the international community awards the greater share of duty to meet them, but also greater rights. We should not be idealists: Business is business.

But something else is important. This state may not have to break up if we stop alarming ourselves over which of the successor states will do better "pulling the fast one" on the other. And if it should actually come to a breakup, the world will not be interested in our trying to pull a fast one. The world's interest will be in seeing whether the successor states observe the rights and freedoms recognized in the civilized world and whether their economy is a beggar who will plead for aid and support, or a promising partner worthy of investment. This is what the citizen ought to know. Then he may possibly tell it to his politicians.

#### Hungarian Minority Parties' Postelection Moves

##### Duray, Carnogursky Meet

92CH07094 Bratislava SZABAD UJSAG in Hungarian  
19 Jun 92 p 2

[Interview with Miklos Duray, president of the Coexistence Political Movement, by "iss", place and date not given: "Carnogursky, Duray Met and Agreed To Let Bygones Be Bygones"]

[Text] At the headquarters of the Christian Democratic Movement /KDM KDH in Slovakia/ early yesterday evening several members of the movement's leadership met for one hour with Miklos Duray, the president of the Coexistence

*Political Movement. The meeting had been proposed by the KDM and Jan Carnogursky, respectively. Our reporter interviewed Miklos Duray on what transpired at the meeting.*

[Duray] The invitation was rather unexpected, and it was also distorted when it reached me. Originally Carnogursky and I were to have conferred in private, but in the end several others also were present on behalf of the KDM. For instance, Jan Petrik and Ivan Simko, among others. We were supposed to discuss, first of all, parliamentary cooperation but because the KDM had just gone into opposition for the first time, it was inevitable that also the past should crop up in the talks. The KDM objected mainly to the fact that, in our Memorandum last year, we had pointed out, with reference to results compiled by the Center for Social and Public Opinion Research, that ethnic Hungarians are more mature and readier for parliamentary democracy. In the KDM's opinion, with such an approach we are harming the prospects of cooperation. Naturally, I told them that this was not our finding, but a research result. And I also reminded them that in conjunction with Meciar's taking over from Carnogursky as prime minister, the KDM has repeatedly emphasized that we and the left are the only ones with whom they have no desire to cooperate. In the end we agreed to cast a veil over the past and try to cooperate, in the interest of Slovakia's democratic development as a rule-of-law state. In my opinion, the KDM is not yet fully aware of its position in parliament, especially of the fact that in the Slovak parliament [Slovak National Council] it has no partner other than us. I also called attention to the existence of stages in the development of rule-of-law statehood and democracy, such as the guaranteeing of minority rights, for instance. And I requested the KDM's support on the question of our cultural and educational autonomy. For the time being, Carnogursky and his followers are not averse to providing such support, but they are making it conditional on the progress in talks to be held in Hungary about ethnic Slovaks in that country. I assured the Christian Democrats that we have taken steps to urge the enactment of a Minority Law in Hungary, but that is outside the scope of our authority. At the same time, we are Czechoslovak citizens, and the exercise of our rights cannot be made contingent on how another country treats its minorities. I also proposed that we start a series of talks on Slovakia's future and on its integration into Central Europe and Europe, respectively. They were not averse to this proposal, and talks between us will probably continue in the near future.

### Deputy Chairmanships Sought

*20 CH0709R Bratislava SZAB1D UJS4G in Hungarian  
19 Jun 92 p 2*

[Article by "n" "There Will Be No Ethnic Hungarian Deputy Chairman of the Slovak National Council, but Prokes Is In"]

[Text] On the invitation of Milan Zemko, a deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council, the representatives of the five political parties that have won seats in the Slovak Parliament met again yesterday in the building of the Slovak National Council in Pozsony [Bratislava]. As expected, the political parties discussed dividing the three

deputy chairmanships of the Slovak National Council and the composition of its committees. On the basis of the results of earlier talks, three deputy chairmanships have been proposed for the time being, to be allotted as follows: one to the victorious Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], and one each to its two partners who have been disavowed up to now, namely the Slovak National Party [SNS] and the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]. According to information obtained from the head office of the Coexistence Political Movement, the Hungarian coalition came to the talks with a proposal calling for the creation of five deputy chairmanships in the Slovak National Council. In addition to its chairman, one deputy chairmanship could then be allotted to each of the political parties that have won parliamentary seats. During deliberations that lasted late into the night, this proposal failed to gain acceptance. But it became evident that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was nominating Ivan Gasparovic as chairman, and Augustin Marian Huska as its deputy chairman. As a result of the talks, the first deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council will be Peter Weiss, the president of the Party of the Democratic Left. The remaining deputy chairmanship will be filled by Jozef Prokes, the president of the Slovak National Party.

### Civic Party Negotiates

*20 CH0709C Bratislava SZAB1D UJS4G in Hungarian  
19 Jun 92 pp 1-2*

[Unattributed article "The Hungarian Civic Party Sincerely Regrets, but It Will Want To Help the Meciar Government"]

[Text] "We are sorry that Vaclav Klaus will not be forming the federal government," said Karoly Toth, the vice president of the Hungarian Civic Party [MOS], at a press conference the party held in Pozsony [Bratislava] yesterday. Toth believes that the federal government that will now be forming will be merely a weak and shaky one and will only widen further the differences, particularly the economic ones, between the Czech and the Slovak Republics. He, too, agrees that the federal government to be formed will be presiding over its own liquidation, but the Hungarian Civic Party is confident that everything will take place in accordance with the Constitution.

The vice president reported that merger talks have begun with Slovakia's Civic Democratic Party [ODS], the Democratic Party [DS], and the Civic Democratic Union [ODU] with the aim of forming a single right-wing party in Slovakia.

Regarding the educational, cultural and territorial autonomy that the ethnic Hungarian political forces in parliament are demanding, Karoly Toth said, no statement will be made until a detailed draft proposal on these questions will have become available. Up to now, all these demands have been merely words, and in that form they are extremely dangerous. Because what Coexistence means by territorial autonomy is known as regionalism throughout the world." Karoly Toth also noted that, on the basis of the election results, the Hungarian Civic Party enjoys the support of a quarter of the Hungarian minority. In the future the party intends to elaborate alternative programs that might be of help to the future Slovak government in solving various professional questions.

### Suchocka's Parliamentary Record Discussed

92EP058A Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE in Polish  
No 28, 11 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by Helena Kowalik: "Power of Elegant Composure"]

[Text] "Who is this?" the young journalists, who write mostly parliamentary columns, kept asking about Hanna Suchocka Saturday afternoon. And one should not be surprised that the candidate for the position of the prime minister has not left an imprint in their memory, although she has been appearing on Wiejska Street already since 1980. Sejm deputy Suchocka has not provided so far any scoop for the author of the "Parliamentary Chronicle," either. She is a lady, both in the way she dresses (during the last term she was named the best dressed woman among female deputies) and the way she behaves. Male deputies, having magnanimously acknowledged her leading role among the parliament workaholics, readily voted Hanna Suchocka to be deputy chairwoman of the busiest commission—the legislative one.

One has to browse through the records of that commission to find out what one can expect from the prime minister in a skirt (itself a part of an elegant suit).

### My Dear Colleagues, You Are Saboteurs

Deputy Suchocka has worked on the draft of the small constitution for many months. The problem of the mutual relations between legislative and executive power was becoming more and more relevant, given the visible weakness of the government, the president's initiatives in that regard and...the growing phenomenon of Sejm deputies and senators taking over the positions of voivodes. In April of this year, the atmosphere during the commission's sessions became truly nervous because the question of granting the decree-issuing power to the government arose. One day, deputy Suchocka confronted deputy Oleksy of PKLD [Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left] when he claimed that the small constitution was in fact not about making the power more efficient but about its new division, which would amount to the departure from the parliamentary system for the sake of the presidential-cabinet system.

Hanna Suchocka attempted to convince her opponent that although the government would be appointed by the president, its existence would depend upon the parliament's vote of confidence.

Earlier, she pointed out in an interview to GAZETA POZNANSKA that the present parliamentary system was outdated: "Within the framework of the separation of powers we have to insist on strengthening the president's executive power. The government cannot be entangled into ups and downs of the parliamentary 'stock market,' especially when the parliament itself is unable to form a stable majority. The only solution is to introduce a firm vote of nonconfidence whereby the opposition, while ousting the government, would have to provide a candidate [for the position of the prime

minister] and, what's more important, obtain the majority of votes in the parliament. Only the election of the new prime minister would mean that the former chief of the government has been deposed."

They say about her: she is industrious and persistent in striving to accomplish her goals. She was very upset when the work on the small constitution dragged on, due to the lack of a quorum. She informed the press: "I have an impression that the commission works as if it were writing the constitution for the first time in history, not knowing the principles proved to be true already two hundred years ago." She tried to convince everybody who would listen that the small constitution was necessary because the prospects for having worked out the big one were remote. However, when the parliamentary draft of the small constitution began to differ very much from the presidential one, she managed to push through the Sejm a resolution that made Lech Walesa withdraw his draft. It meant in practice that several months worth of the commission's work were crossed out and the whole task had to be undertaken anew.

During the work on the small constitution she lost her usual composure only once. It was on May 28, when, after two hours of deliberations, the deputies adopted none of the 71 articles of the draft. "It looks like sabotage," the deputy chairwoman of the legislative commission summed up the work of her colleagues. In this way she supported the president, who urged them to finish the task, threatening even a little: "I will encourage them more and more, then I will cheer them on, and then I will act."

But one cannot say that she has been in Walesa's camp. When, on May 31, deputy Aleksander Bentkowski, having recalled the resolution about the disclosure of the SB [Security Service] agents, proposed that the small constitution contain a provision which would grant the president the veto power with regard to Sejm's resolutions, his motion failed, due to deputy Suchocka's objection. She said at that time: "The fact that the Sejm acts foolishly does not mean that the president should be granted the power to control the parliament's resolutions, especially when they pertain to its internal affairs."

### I Am Against

She was surprisingly cold-blooded during the parliamentary discussion about the method of drafting and adopting the constitution. Calmly and matter-of-factly she presented her commission's three proposals. Although the discussion was based on her data, she did not participate in it, while other deputies were jumping at each other's throats. For it was then that deputy Lopuszanski called the deputy Kwasniewski's parliamentary club address "an insult to Poland," that deputy Markiewicz implied that a few little Napoleons and Hitlers were trying to control the nation's political life and that deputy Malachowski detected "white bolshevism" in deputy Lopuszanski's speech.

During the Sejm's previous term, there were four votes by name. Although deputy Hanna Suchocka worked under the banner of the Democratic Union from the beginning, her position differed from that of the party's parliamentary club on some issues. She opted for the senate draft of the antiabortion law. She cast a "nay" vote when the president vetoed the election law. (Let's recall the circumstances of that event: Lech Wałęsa refused to sign the election law in June of last year. It could have led to the dissolution of the Sejm, unable at that point to work out a new law, given the fact that the draft accepted by the deputies was a compromise long in the making.)

She cast a yes vote on the issue of retirement benefits. In October, the parliamentary commissions changed the governmental draft of the retirement benefits bill so as to increase those benefits. The government claimed that such a bill could not be implemented, due to the state of the budget. Hanna Suchocka accepted the government case, even though this did not please her electorate.

On the other hand, during the open voting on the dismissal of the Bielecki government she did not support the motion of deputy Ziolkowska, her electoral district colleague, because she thought that such a change, two months before the elections, would only be harmful. However, she accepted prime minister Bielecki's argumentation only partially when he asked Sejm to grant his government the decree-issuing power. "If at all," she said, "then only in the budgetary matters. We cannot permit any interruption in the payment of the retirement and other benefits. But one has to abandon the wishful thinking that granting extraordinary powers to the government would cure the economy."

#### Life's Milestones

She is a graduate of the Poznań University law department where she received a doctoral degree in constitutional law. During the Sejm's eighth term she belonged to an active group of SD [Democratic Party] deputies, who petitioned the Sejm's Presidium that parliament not convene during martial law. "Martial law will not last a short time," answered then-Marshal Andrzej Werblan. For this action, Hanna Suchocka was suspended as a party member. She finally quit SD in 1984. By that time she was already active in Solidarity.

Given this experience, last October she supported an OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club] draft of a bill that would declare the imposition of martial law in Poland illegal. However, she opposed another draft which would declare criminal those political organizations active in 1989.

GAZETA WYBORCZA's quick survey among deputies of various parties, conducted a few minutes after the name of Hanna Suchocka as a candidate for the post of the prime minister was "leaked" into the corridors of the Sejm, indicated that she was commonly respected and liked. Still, she managed to make some enemies. When she was elected the chairwoman of the Polish, 24-member group to participate in the Council of Europe

there were two votes against her and one abstention. She has never tried to identify those opponents.

On Sunday, at 0500, she realized that she had opponents on Wiejska Street. This time she knew their names.

#### Tank Exports Seen Impeded by Western Concerns

92EP05544 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No. 28  
11 Jul 92 p 6

[Article by Jan Dziadul: "Immoral Tanks"]

[Text] The Polish armament factories, which until recently would make hundreds of millions of dollars on their exports, could submit their candidacy for the Nobel Peace Prize today. An excellent example of this is one of the largest tank factories in the world, Bumar Fabryki w Gliwicach.

About 10,000 tanks of the "T" class roam around the world, not including the former USSR. They have been made in the factories of today's Russia, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, due to the war and the collapse of the state, is currently unable to put together even one tank, while continuing the spare parts production only at the minimal level. The quantity and quality of tank production in Russia and Ukraine is on the decline.

Thus, only Poland and Czechoslovakia are left in this huge market (an eventual replacement of the armor systems could take tens of years). It is a dreary time. In this situation, when one can make an honest profit and guarantee jobs for the employees of 400 factories (that many companies cooperate in the tank production), it is a situation conducive to the preservation and development of our defense industry. However, production of tanks has ceased while their export is being hindered (actually, that can be said about all types of weapons). The successive governments do not know what to do with the armament industry—factories with the most advanced technical equipment and the best-trained cadres in the country.

Instead of decisions, lectures on the immorality of weapons production and exports are being delivered (even from the neighborhood of the Belvedere). Righteous opinions indeed! But why do they have to be first to our country, until recently a small exporter (2 percent of the world arms trade), while others continue, including the great democracies that we try to imitate, to make colossal profits on this business? The United States has doubled its arms exports in the last few years, undoubtedly to the detriment of Poland, among others. It is immoral for us to make and export arms (we have sold about 100 million dollars' worth of them), but it is moral to import them (about one billion dollars' worth) and keep alive the foreign armament industries. It would not be that bad if such imports were paid for with the money earned through the armament industry exports. But, having blocked our arms exports, we pay for their import with credits and the American firms involved

exports. It is worth pondering whether simple competition, and an intention to eliminate us from the extremely profitable arms market, are not behind the screen of ethics.

Ever since tank production began in Lubedz in the midfifties, Moscow decided what and how many we had to make. Today, the factory's empty shops are swept by rumors that the American Embassy delicately suggested what we should not be producing. Also, British consulting firms have been encouraging us to close down the armament industry (Great Britain is the forth largest arms exporter in the world).

NOWA EUROPA, quoting INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE stated in March that 1.3 million Americans would lose their defense industry jobs in the next few years. This is an indirect result of the USSR's collapse and the end of the arms race. It is beyond doubt that the United States will do everything to keep employment in its industry. One solution is increasing arms exports. Needless to say, in Poland, it is the armament industry that has been most affected by unemployment.

For many years, the Main Engineering Directorate (CEN/IN) was the sole Polish arms exporter. Since the second half of 1990, arms makers can also sell their products. In 1991, Bumar-Lubedz conducted advanced negotiations with three partners. Only the "T" needed to be dotted in order to close a deal with Syria on the delivery of 200 tanks for almost \$300 million. The consent of the MSZ [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], which accepts the destination of sales, was supposed to be that dot. MSZ's "negative list" includes states at war, civil war areas, and terrorist organizations.

International decisions in state policy at that time prohibited arms exports to Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, El Salvador, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Syria, and Taiwan (Yugoslavia has been added to that list recently). Therefore, Bumar did not get permission to export tanks to Syria. Nor did MSZ approve sales to two other countries (it cannot name them), although they were not on the "negative list." Additional sources claim that our authorities "screamed" at Sy's suggestions of a friendly nation.

As a result, it was Lubedz, which had offered tanks to Syria. The agreement was signed, and delivery is in progress. It cannot be changed by propaganda stunts in the form of interrupting a shop with a few tanks or boxes of spare parts aboard a confidential source informs us that our southern neighbors have not been subjected to any international sanctions because of that. By comparison, all the former socialist states, except Yugoslavia, having done good business and forcing firmly set its face in that market for years to come, contingent on the more advanced help of developing its armament industry. Their argument was clear. As long as you do not help to re-industrialize that segment of industry, we will be making and selling arms. Poland did not have quite so defined its national interests in this way.

At the very time when Iran expresses its interest in buying 1,000 T-72 tanks (worth about 1.5 billion dollars plus several hundred million dollars for the service infrastructure), we hear contemptuous opinions about our domestic production. After all, our tanks ended up mostly in Iraq. It is known what the Coalition did to Hussein's "power" (read to the Polish-made weapons among others). Indeed, T-72's did not play any major role in that war, but neither did the allies' tanks. Dug in the desert sand, T-72's were defenseless against American, British, and French tank-destroying helicopters and planes (after the destruction of the Iraqi air force). However, all other tanks would have been defenseless in the same situation.

The Gulf war, apart from being an effective and flashy display of the air force in action, was a propaganda masterpiece as well. An information blockade is rather a total information monopoly, contributed to the fact that the effectiveness of weaponry, mostly American was above 100 percent. Simultaneously with the ground campaign, an advertising campaign for military equipment was taking place full scale, designed to bring results in years to come. Today it is known that, among other things, American Abrams tanks loaded with electronics were easily disabled by sand in their tracks. It is also known that only a few Iraqi Scuds were shot down by the Patriot missiles, most of them got through that defense system.

After the Gulf war, a professional magazine, INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, appraised the equipment used by both sides. The T-72 was rated as average among this type of combat vehicle, comparable with Western ones such as the Chieftain, the AMX 30 R2, and the Leopard 1. Its main qualities were its small size and the effectiveness of its cannon. Its main flaw was the quality of the fire control computer. Supply the T-72 is not a Mercedes among tanks but not only Mercedes ride around the world. Also its price (one third of that of Western tanks) and its relatively simple maintenance are to its advantage. But the most important factor is that there is a true demand for equipment of this class.

The T-72, having been manufactured for years and having undergone continuous modernization at Lubedz, has retained only its Soviet origin. It is produced almost entirely with 20 percent of its parts from Czechoslovakia. Our participation in their tank production is comparable. No wonder that people have begun talking loudly about combining our capacities to form joint armament ventures. The Polish side is already, for adjustment in the construction of a new type of tank, which will surpass twice the combat capabilities of the T-72. Our southern neighbors are more convinced than we are that there has to exist an armament industry in Central Europe, independent of and competitive with the western and eastern ones.

Lubedz has for years lobbied an export, but had previously only minimal deliveries to its army, always poor quality, even dangerously defective. If the current trend in the modernization of our armament forces (which takes place

any T-72's). At the same time, despite successful attempts at cooperation with Krupp, Volvo and MAN (construction machinery), 90 percent of that factory's production potential is contained in the armament assemble lines, now dead. The ratio of the military production potential to the civilian production potential is bad. Successive governments have called to change it, without, however, allocating a zloty for that purpose, while at the same time they have encouraged us to keep the tank assembly lines open (just in case), without allocating means for this purpose either. A vicious circle indeed, further exaggerated by the fact that new ministers of industry come with each new government. While in the span of three years the new bosses have been repeatedly introduced to the problem, the factory has been laying people off (more than 2,500 by now), and is awaiting decisions on the armament industry.

It has not been waiting passively. It has developed a restructuring program, according to which civilian and military production would be balanced. The only feasible source of financing that program is the export of T-72's and the launching of the production of the new tank. It is related to politics and the state's defense doctrine.

Is our army going to use the Polish equipment wherever possible, or ride German Leopards, 10 million dollars apiece? Do we have to stop tank production and immobilize this part of "the death factories" (our politicians use such labels) only because we can buy better vehicles in the West, where, as it is widely known, they have been made in "peace factories"? The desirable arms standardization with NATO members does not have to mean that Polish models will be abandoned. By the same token, weaponry of Soviet origin does not have to be intrinsically bad: technology is quite apolitical, as was proved in Germany, where Soviet equipment (not only MiG-29's) has been adapted to the Bundeswehr's systems and strategy.

Without doubt, the time of global peace has come, which we should nothing but enjoy. However, global peace does not mean regional peace. The former and present superpowers are trying to preserve their overblown armament industries through arms exports. Until now, these assets have been the engine of technical modernization and progress. They have guaranteed jobs and social peace. Why should we spurn this chance, which for us is slight anyway?

**FRY Memorandum on Croatian Involvement in B-H**

92BA11874 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian  
17 Jun 92 p 4

[Memorandum of the Yugoslav Presidency: "Aggression and Annexation of Portions of Bosnia-Hercegovina"]

[Text] The Yugoslav Presidency has sent to UN Secretary-General Butrus-Ghali a "Memorandum on Involvement of the Republic of Croatia in the Military Conflicts in Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H]." This is the last document of what until now has been the Yugoslav Presidency.

With the memorandum and abundant accompanying documentation, the Presidency points out to Butrus-Ghali the "deep political involvement and military involvement of the Republic of Croatia in B-H, which are on a scale to qualify as conventional armed aggression and actual annexation of a portion of B-H."

The entire text of the memorandum, which was delivered yesterday to TANJUG, is as follows:

During 1991 and 1992, Yugoslavia on several occasions communicated to international factors and the international public facts concerning the involvement of the Republic of Croatia in political relations and military events in B-H.

The knowledge and facts presented in this memorandum not only confirm the allegations contained in the report of UN Secretary-General Butrus-Ghali on 30 May of this year, but also make it possible to examine more broadly the specific involvement and direct intervention of the Republic of Croatia in events in B-H.

The political involvement and aggression of the Republic of Croatia against certain areas of B-H were systematically prepared over a lengthy period of time. This is confirmed by the publicly stated interest of the incumbent parties and other political parties in the Republic of Croatia, defined in their programs. It is important to emphasize in this connection that at the time of the parliamentary elections in Croatia these parties were overtly or covertly expressing territorial claims against B-H.

The political leaders of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and other parties in Croatia are becoming more and more involved in political life in B-H as though this were a part of the territory of Croatia. Since its own General Convention in February 1990, the HDZ has been striving to broaden its influence on B-H. It formed a political movement, that is, its own organizations of the HDZ in B-H. During 1990 and 1991, even government institutions of the Republic of Croatia, especially institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MUP] and defense, systematically operated toward B-H and on its territory.

Broad-scale military involvement in B-H for all practical purposes began with establishment of the "Sarajevo truce" at the beginning of January of this year, and as the

UN peacekeeping forces were deployed, Croatia systematically sent a portion of its own armed forces, which were under UN protection, into areas within B-H. The culmination of Croatia's military involvement in B-H followed in late May and the first half of June. In recent days, numerous specific reports have gone out into the world concerning the general offensive of armed forces from Croatia into several areas in B-H.

Specific data and documents have been gathered concerning the operation of Croatia toward B-H aimed at its annexation. We quote the statements of Croatian leaders to illustrate the continuity of the preparation for military involvement.

Josip Boljkovac, minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Croatia, officially presented a position on 6 March 1991 indicating aims of conquest toward B-H. Referring to the activity of individuals in the Ustasha emigre community whom the top leaders brought to Croatia, he said: "They are pushing us toward Bosnia to make up the loss of territory from Bosnia, but that is not so easy. We are trying with Croats in Hercegovina who share our views and Huska's Muslims to speed that up, but the positions of the Serbs and the Yugoslav orientation are very strong there. You see, no sooner did we agree with their people in the MUP to train their special people in our camps in Lucko, Rakitje, and Kumrovec than this immediately got out. It was also learned immediately that Junc was to go to Hercegovina and to organize armed detachments there to destroy Yugoslavia through Bosnia and to strengthen a Hercegovian strike against Krajina."

On the eve of recognition of the statehood of the Republic of Croatia by the countries of the European Community (EC), on 24 December 1991, Franjo Tudjman told the London newspaper DAILY TELEGRAPH that he would urgently seize parts of neighboring B-H on grounds that "it would be unacceptable to leave them (the Croats in B-H) to the merciless terror they face."

In a meeting of HDZ leaders for B-H on 2 February 1992 in Listica (western Hercegovina), which was attended by Stjepan Mesic from the leadership of the Croatian HDZ, there was a discussion of the future status of B-H. These views were presented: (1) B-H as an independent state (advocated by Stjepan Kljuic, president of the HDZ for B-H) and (2) B-H annexed by Croatia (advocated by Mate Boban and Stjepan Mesic). After that, Stjepan Kljuic was replaced, and at that meeting Mate Boban actually took over leadership of the HDZ for B-H. Stjepan Mesic ordered that preparations be stepped up for a final showdown with the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] in B-H, emphasizing that Croatia would help them wholeheartedly in that effort. This conclusion had major political consequences and resulted in the direct military aggression of Croatian forces against B-H.

—Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, president of the Croatian People's Party [HNS], declared in mid-April of this year: "that volunteers from Croatia who are fighting in B-H must go through military training."

—Dobroslav Paraga, president of the Croatian Rights Party [HSP] and the commander in chief of the Croatian Defense Forces (OS), an advocate of the idea of "Croatia's border on the Drina," declared on 3 June 1992 that the Croatian Rights Party was regularly sending its volunteers "into Herceg-Bosnia," emphasizing that they are respecting the "command of the Supreme Command of the Croatian Army [HV]" and that "the Croatian Government wants at any price to prove that Croatia is not intervening in the war in B-H but at the same time is sending there its fighters and generals."

#### Croatia's Military Involvement in B-H

The military aggression of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia against the sovereign and independent state of B-H in its character, its scope, its territorial diversity, its pace, its mass use of units and use of modern weapons demonstrates unambiguously that this is classic armed aggression for the purpose of conquering and annexing B-H. Numerous documents indicate not only the scale of Croatian military involvement in B-H and the use of the most up-to-date military equipment and armament, but also the incredible brutality of the Croatian armed formations toward the civilian population, above all Serbs.

The involvement of the Croatian Army has been manifested in the arming of the Croatian and Muslim population in B-H, military training of citizens of Croatian and Muslim nationality in military and police centers in Croatia and on the territory of B-H, mobilizing and recruiting personnel of Croatian and Muslim nationality, infiltration of terrorist commando groups and conduct of raids, artillery action from the territory of the Republic of Croatia against border areas of B-H where Serbs live. Large-scale slaughter and massacres of the Serbian population and expulsion from their homes, use of agricultural airplanes reequipped for combat action, and the sending of special units of the Croatian Army into particular areas of B-H. We will document some of these forms of military involvement.

#### The Arming of the Croatian and Muslim Population

Croatia's political and government leadership took steps to carry the armed conflicts to B-H even back during the time of armed conflicts on the territory of the Serbian krajinas. Armament and other equipment was supplied through numerous channels to extremist members of the HDZ and SDA [Democratic Action Party] in B-H, who were the nucleus for creating paramilitary formations. Members of the Croatian Army were also sent into that republic with false credentials and the "mission of helping the military organization of the political parties, the HDZ, and the SDA."

We cite only some examples of the illegal armament of members of the SDA and HDZ for B-H for which we have statements and admissions and other legal evidence:

(Covered in more detail in the annex)

—Muhamed Zulic, minister in the Government of the Republic of Croatia, who was arrested for transporting arms, in a statement made to official authorities said that as minister in the Government of the Republic of Croatia he had attended several meetings where there was discussion of collecting money and purchasing weapons for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Guard Corps [ZNG] of the Republic of Croatia. A list of the necessary armament and equipment for Bosanska Krajina which was supposed to be delivered from Croatia was found on his person (Annex 1).

—Bajro Kasumovic, commander of the opstina TO [Territorial Defense] staff in Zivinice Opstina, in a written statement to official authorities on 3 May 1992 furnished data on the advancement of armament from Croatia to Muslim armed formations in B-H, which is backed up by an affidavit which he signed (Annex 2).

—Salih Malkic, reserve member of the MUP and member of the Crisis Command Center of the Zivinice SO [Opstina Assembly], in a statement made to official authorities on 30 April 1992 spoke of delivering armament from Croatia to the territory of that opstina to meet the needs of Muslim armed formations in B-H (Annex 3).

#### Military-Police Training

Several thousand citizens of Croatian and Muslim nationality from B-H have been trained in the training center of the Croatian MUP. In Annex 4, we furnish a list with principal data on 914 people from B-H who went through training, mainly from Livno, Ljubuski, Cazin, and Velika Kladusa Opstinas and from Sarajevo. This practice of the planned sending of people from B-H to join the MUP and ZNG of the Republic of Croatia, initiated and organized by the HDZ, SDA, and MUP of B-H, has continued.

#### Infiltration of Commando-Terrorist Groups

From the abundant documentation, we single out only certain examples of infiltration of commando-terrorist groups from Croatia into B-H:

—In Brcko (B-H), on 9 January 1991 a commando-terrorist group was detected and arrested on the bridge over the Sava River; it consisted of the following: Radosav Ivanic, Vinko Vucicevic, Marko Kovacevic, Zeljko Gasparevic, and Anton Terzic. The group's mission was to carry out a commando operation against a military supply train at the Brcko Railroad Station.

Because aside from other armament the train contained 2,000 kg of explosive, 300 antitank mines, 1,600 anti-personnel mines, 2,000 detonator caps, about 180 tons of ammunition, and two tons of gasoline, there is no doubt that performance of that mission, because of the very location of the railroad station (in the center of the town), would have caused a high number of civilian casualties and horrible destruction.

The datum that this group was sent by the Zupanja chief of police (Croatia), while the chief of the public security station in Brcko was to help in carrying out the mission, is indicative of the plan to carry combat action onto the territory of B-H and to draw it into the armed conflicts. However, it indubitably follows from the testimony of members of this group that the approval for performance of this terrorist mission was given personally by Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia (Annex 5).

—Near the village of Svodna, Bosanski Novi, a terrorist group was detected and arrested on 18 November 1991, its task was to demolish the bridge on the Una. The group was sent by the command of the ZNG in Zagreb, and the mission was planned, organized, and directed by Emin Teskerzic, one of the commanders in the ZNG sports company on Jarun in Zagreb. The group consisted of members of the ZNG and persons from B-H as helpers, that is, accomplices (Annex 6).

-Four members of the HOS [Croatian Defense Forces] were arrested while carrying out combat missions in the village Velja Medja, Ljubinje SO (B-H), on 27 March 1992. They said that they came to Ljubuski, which is the location of the HOS Supreme Command for western Hercegovina, on the basis of a written recommendation of Mile "Hawk" Dedakovic, former commander of the ZNG in Vukovar, to carry out commando-terrorist actions (Annex 7).

—In the vicinity of the village Krivodol, near the Mostar Airport (B-H), Pesa Marin, born in New Jersey, a citizen of the United States, was arrested on 13 March 1992. He came to Yugoslavia on 6 February 1992 by way of Austria. Pesa was captured as a member of the "Frankopan" Battalion (Bojna), which was sent from Kumrovec (Croatia) into western Hercegovina to carry out combat missions. The reason given for their departure to members of the battalion was that "the Croatian Army must pass over onto the territory of B-H and drive out the Yugoslav Army" and "Chetniks" before the "blue helmets" arrive, so that the territory would become a part of Croatia (Annex 8).

#### **Armed Aggression of the Croatian Army Against B-H**

Aggression of units of the Croatian Army against the territory of B-H (Annex 9) is also proved by statements made by members of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia (Annex 9).<sup>1</sup>

Croatia has been attempting with its armed forces to achieve control of the strategic axis western Hercegovina.

—Duvno—Kupres—Bugojno—Zenica and beyond via Doboj to Bosanski Brod, which would achieve encirclement of Bosanska Krajina and Srpska Krajina. Large forces with heavy armament are concentrated along that axis, and this has resulted in the almost complete exodus of the Serbian population from the areas Livno, Duvno, Kupres, Bugojno, etc.

Strong and well-armed forces of the Croatian Army which carry out armed actions almost daily are present

on the territory of the following opstinas: Velika Kladusa, Mostar, Capljina, Posusje, Listica, Grude, Ljubuski, Citluk, Stolac, Neum, Vitez, Ozak, Bosanski Samac, Orasje, Breko, Derventa, Prnjavor, Kotor Varos, Kupres, etc.

In western Hercegovina, a war command center of the HOS has been formed for Hercegovina and was commanded until recently by Blaz Kraljevic, member of the terrorist organization HRB [Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood] and [involved in] other criminal activity of which the Austrian federal police are aware.

On the territory of western Hercegovina and in the Neretva valley, Croatian armed forces number about 20,000; they are operating together with members of military units consisting of Croats and Muslims from B-H. On the territory of Neum Opstina alone there are about 10,000 members of the ZNG who came from the vicinity of Split.

Early this March a meeting was held in Citluk of members of the HDZ and HOS to discuss ways and means of attacks and actions by 6,000 of their members deployed in the areas of Vrgorac, Citluk, and Ljubuski.

On the territory of Cazinska Krajina, about 20,000 members of various military formations are operating, including about 2,000 members of the ZNG. In early March of this year, a reinforcement of 300 members of the HOS reached the territory of Velika Kladusa with the mission of initiating a breakthrough toward Slunj (an opstina under UN protection).

On the territory of Vitez Opstina in central Bosnia, a unit of 573 members of the HOS has been trained under the command of Darko Kraljevic. The training was done by Branko Santic, an extremist emigre who has returned from Australia. This unit was joined by a unit of 150 members of the HOS already mobilized in Croatia.

Other available data which have been presented also show that the Republic of Croatia has actually occupied certain areas of B-H (detailed data in Annex 10).

Visits, tours, and inspections by high-level military figures from the Supreme Command of the armed forces of Croatia have become frequent in the occupied areas of B-H.

General Janko Bobetko of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia came to Neum Opstina on 12 February 1992 (B-H). In the days that followed, he toured units of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia on the battlefield and in the B-H opstinas Stolac, Capljina, Mostar, Ljubuski, Livno, and Citluk, and then he was made chief coordinator of that contingent of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia in B-H (he commands units operating in the Neretva valley. On 9 May 1992, Gen. Bobetko visited the Supreme Command of the HOS (D. Paraga) in Ljubuski, where he met Mile "Hawk" Dedakovic, with whom he took up the question of the operation of armed forces of the Republic of Croatia in order to intersect the territory

of B-H along the line Livno—Kupres—Bugojno—Zenica—Doboj—Bosanski Samac.

Antun Tus, supreme commander of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia arrived in Neum (B-H) with a group of officers on 19 May 1992 with the task of inspecting the contingent of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia stationed in the Neretva valley in western Herzegovina, which are taking part in aggression against B-H.

These and numerous other facts indicate not only the presence and involvement of the Croatian Army in B-H, but also the fact that units of the Croatian Army on the territory of B-H are under the direct command of the Supreme Command of the Croatian Army in Zagreb. Their deployment and strength on the territory of B-H are as follows:

**a) Northeastern Bosnia**

- Five to six brigades of the Croatian Army (108th, 124th, 103d, and 139th Brigades and segments of the 101st, 109th, and 131st Brigades. Total 10,000-12,000 men).

**b) Western Herzegovina and the Neretva Valley**

- Ten brigades (4th, 115th, 126th, 142d, 155th, 156th, 119th, 114th, 110th, and 116th Brigades of the Croatian Army), about 20,000 men in all.

**c) Area of Livno, Duvno, and Sujica**

- Three brigades of the Croatian Army (106th and 109th Brigades, and segments of the 115th Brigade of the Croatian Army and of the 1st and 4th Brigades of the ZNG), 5,000-7,000 men in all.

**d) Area of Eastern Herzegovina**

- Three brigades of the Croatian Army (113th, 114th, and 158th Brigades of the HV, and the "Blue Lightning" and "Desert Fox" armored units). A portion of these forces is involved in the area around Dubrovnik. Offensive operations are being conducted by these forces which include artillery bombardment of Trebinje and Nevesinje.

It is estimated that 35,000-40,000 members of the armed forces of Croatia are engaged in areas of independent and sovereign B-H against the Serbian population there.

**Sufferings and Casualties of the Civilian Population**

The sufferings of the civilian Serbian population because of aggression of the Croatian Army against parts of B-H and operation of Croatian-Muslim paramilitary formations from B-H have in their scale and number of casualties taken on the character of genocide, with all the characteristics of that term as defined in international law (homicide and economic, cultural, and spiritual genocide). Documents containing testimony about crimes against the Serbian population show the horrifying extent of the atrocities, the methods of torturing and killing innocent civilians. The number of casualties

has not even been approximated. The public has obtained some knowledge of the large-scale atrocities and suffering of the Serbian population, of which there have been many.

In the very first thrust of the Croatian Armed Forces onto the soil of B-H, a massacre of Serbian civilians was committed in the village Sijekovac, quite close to Bosanski Brod.

Numerous atrocities exceed in their brutality the ability of the normal human mind to comprehend them. We present in the annex some of the statements by Alia Selimagic, a member of Croatian-Muslim paramilitary formations concerning the atrocity against Serbs in the vicinity of Bosanski Brod.

In many areas of B-H, concentration camps have been established in which the Serbian people have been kept for a lengthy period—mostly children, women, and the elderly. Thus, for weeks the fate of about 1,000 Serbs in Tomislavgrad was unknown. About 4,000 Serbs were imprisoned more than a month in Odzak, among them a large number of children, and from there they were sent to prisons on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, and they have been subjected to unprecedented torture. At Bradina near Konjic, a large number of Serbs were kept imprisoned in a tunnel for a long time, and two camps for Serbs were created not far from that tunnel. Croatian paramilitary forces committed a massacre of Serbs in Zenica. In Sarajevo, massacres of dozens of Serbs have already become a regular practice of the Muslim "green berets."

The most recent large-scale atrocities against the Serbian population were committed in the village Cemerno Ilijas Opstina, not far from Sarajevo, when the civilian population, including women, children, and the elderly were massacred in the most bestial way. Houses and other belongings and property acquired during years of work and life have been plundered and burned.

The exodus of the civilian Serbian population is continuing in prisons and camps in the Republic of Croatia. The methods of torture used against them are of such nature that the human mind cannot absorb it. A prestigious scientific institution, the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade, has written a scientific paper on the basis of statements of survivors of the camps and prisons to survey the methods and procedures used in torture. The report of this internationally recognized scientific-medical institution, although the report is important in itself, is an integral part of the appendix to this memorandum (Annex 12).

**Establishment of the Order of the Republic of Croatia on a Portion of the Territory of B-H**

The Government of the Republic of Croatia is being established in the occupied parts of B-H. The legally elected bodies of government have been suspended in several opstinas. Crisis command centers have been formed for the specific area and commissioners appointed; what they do is not influenced at all by the

bodies of government of B-H. The state insignia of the Republic of Croatia: crest, flag, and anthem, are in use in those opstinas.

In the part of B-H where the Croatian population lives, the Croatian system of payment and settlement is in effect, and the legal tender is the Croatian dinar.

Many street and settlement names have been changed after the pattern of what has been done in Croatia. Thus, the small Hercegovian town Duvno has been given the new name Tomislavgrad. These are only external manifestations of the essence, which is that Croatia considers a part of B-H its own territory. This is no longer aggression, this is actually occupation or annexation of parts of B-H.

The world learned something more about this the other day from the extensive report of correspondents of the American wire service Associated Press. A 700-word report of its correspondent, which was published in early June of this year under the headline "Signs of Croatian Military Presence in Bosnia," notes that soldiers in uniforms with the insignia of the Croatian Army and vehicles with Zagreb license plates were a common sight in "new and independent Bosnia," and he went on to say that "the question of what these people are doing on the territory of the sovereign state which is a member of the United Nations is becoming more and more problematical." It goes on to say that the "Croatian dinar is in use" in towns in western Hercegovina, that there are maps with various crests and stars of Croatian military ranks.

#### Footnote

1. We attach in Annex 9 photocopies of the original documents along with statements by the following members of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia:

- Niksa Matijas, member of the 1st Pan-Croat Shock Battalion from Split (captured in Mostar); with his unit he was in the area Siroki Brijeg-Listica.
- Marin Bezdan, member of the ZNG reserves in Neum, "Primorje" Company, a component of the Dubrovnik 116th ZNG Brigade.
- Zoran Kaleb, member of the ZNG from Metkovic, indicates the participation of units from Metkovic in blockade of the garrison at Capljina.
- Sead Tabakovic, civilian from Capljina, indicates the presence of a special unit of the Croatian Army in Capljina.
- Jadran Barada, member of the 114th ZNG Brigade from Split, captured on the territory of B-H in the area of Bijelo Brdo, indicates extensive involvement of the Croatian Army on the territory of Hercegovina.
- Goran Nikolic, civilian from Capljina, indicates existence of a company-battalion of the ZNG in the village Domanovici, Capljina (B-H).
- Mato Perkovic, member of the B-H TO from the village Cardak, Modrica, indicates the tie-up of units of the B-H TO with the Croatian Army and armament from Croatia.

- Ivo Tufekovic, member of the B-H TO from the village Gornji Hasic, Bosanski Samac, indicates the military training of members of the HDZ for commando-terrorist actions in Slavonski Brod
- Mato Tufekovic, member of the B-H TO from the village Gornji Hasic, Bosanski Samac, indicates the armament of members of the TO from Croatia through the Crisis Command Center in the village.
- Djuro Vuckovic, member of the B-H TO from the village Gornji Hasic, indicates armament of members of this unit with weapons from Croatia and delivery over the bridge at Bosanski Samac and the ferry in the village Domljevac

On the territory of Kupres in early April 1992, 44 members of the Croatian Army involved in combat operations in that area were captured. These persons were members of the 114th Brigade of the ZNG from Split and the 1st Student Battalion from Zagreb and the regular Croatian Army.

#### Social Aspect of Crisis in Serbia Examined

92BA1213A Belgrade Vreme in Serbo-Croatian  
29 Jun 92 pp 31-33

[Article by Srlobran Brankovic, M.A., research associate of the Political Studies Institute in Belgrade. "The Frame Is Bursting"]

[Text] It might be said that the increasingly strong political and propaganda pressures and the ever-stronger repression are the only way, or at least the main way, in which the authoritarian Serbian regime reacts to the steady growth of ethnic, social, and political tensions, following the rule: The greater the conflict, the stronger the repression. But now the steel frame with which that regime has put us in irons has also come to face external pressure.

The "to be not to be" question for Serbia is whether at this moment the frame (whatever we mean by the term) must finally burst, or that external pressure will strengthen it, and our stumbling in its (his) steely embrace will be perpetuated indefinitely.

If we approach the problem from the standpoint of social prospects for something to change, we will encounter an almost inexplicable paradox at the very outset. It might be most briefly described this way: disintegration of the country, utter collapse of ethnic policy, bloody warfare, accelerated pauperization of the population, complete international isolation—all of that in just a year and a half, and all of that in Europe, and nevertheless without any logical or expected change in the government. To be sure, all those circumstances have aroused great dissatisfaction in the population: According to a survey in March of the Political Studies Institute, 62.3 percent of the population showed a high degree of dissatisfaction with their own and the general social situation.

The intensity of dissatisfaction with their own and the social situation is in turn in a high (anticipated) negative correlation with allegiance to the incumbent party (the greater the dissatisfaction, the lower the percentage of supporters of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]), but still

16 percent of those who are dissatisfied are committed to that party, and that means one-third of its supporters. Those 10 percent or so of the electorate who display both high dissatisfaction and commitment to the incumbent party are perhaps the best expression and living picture of the paradox with which we are concerned here, which comes down to the question of how the government stays

in power in spite of the high dissatisfaction of the population. This trend of the political mood of the population has produced, as we see, a significant continuous drop in the percentage of the SPS vote in the period between elections, but the SPS is still the strongest single party

	(in percent)				
	Elections 9 Dec 90	30 May 91 (IPS <sup>1</sup> )	5 Nov 91 (IPS)	5 Mar 92 (IPS)	Elections 31 May 92
SPS	32.8	29.9	29.8	26.2	24.3

<sup>1</sup>Political Studies Institute

### Who Is Governing Serbia?

Every attempt to examine this paradox must start with the question of who the supporters of the SPS are and why they see their own political future precisely in the policy of that party? In other words, how did the SPS get their vote and thereby win the election? The usual explanations of manipulation of the media are not sufficient, because they demand an answer to the question of why a sizable portion of the electorate is susceptible to that kind of manipulation, and that in turn makes it necessary to briefly sketch a social and political picture of that segment of the political public in which the incumbent party finds its support.

### Social Portrait of Supporters of the SPS

In all the studies that the "Medium" Center of the Political Studies Institute has conducted, an almost identical picture emerges of the social base of the incumbent party. As the graphs show, it obtains its main support from elderly citizens with a quite low level of education, and the occupational breakdown shows that pensioners, housewives, and those employed in the socialized sector are most inclined toward it (Figures 2, 3, and 4 [not included]). For the sake of comparison, the graphs also show the influence of the Democratic Party [DS] (in certain occupational and educational categories) or parties in the democratic opposition (SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement], DS, NSS [People's Peasant Party], and RS [Radical Party]) in various age groups. The parties of the democratic opposition, as we also see, mainly rely on secondary and university students, the unemployed, and liberal professions, on a considerably younger age group, and on a public that on the average has a much higher level of education.

Even a superficial comparison of these two segments of the social structure will show that the social strata in which the SPS has the most supporters comprise approximately half of Serbia's electorate, while those in which the opposition is influential comprise only slightly more than one-third. In Serbia, that is, according to the last census, there are 2,297,090 persons employed in the

socialized sector and over one million pensioners (the total is about 3.3 million); at the same time, there are about 650,000 unemployed, secondary and university students represent about 530,000, and owners and employees in the private sector number only about 170,000 (totaling about 1.35 million). The group made up of citizens with no education, unskilled, semiskilled, skilled, and highly skilled (where the SPS has lost of its supporters) is 1.5-fold larger than the group with secondary, junior postsecondary or senior postsecondary education, in which the influence of these two political groupings was approximately equal, or the democratic opposition had an edge.

These more or less well-known coordinates of our electorate cannot, of course, be interpreted in simplified fashion by saying, for instance, that those employed in the socialized sector or on the other hand pensioners, are completely committed to the SPS, while secondary and university students are committed to the opposition. On the contrary, although the SPS is the most influential party in the category of those employed in the socialized sector, only slightly more than one-fourth of the citizens in that category are committed to it.

### Political Profile of SPS Supporters

The predominance of undemocratic and authoritarian political culture is another important part of the social portrait of that segment of the political public which supports the incumbent party.

In the March survey of political public opinion, the predisposition of the citizens of Serbia was to authoritarian government, i.e., that characteristic known in the literature as the authoritarian attitude of the subject. It can be seen from the table below that the SPS obtained the most votes (49.8 percent) in the group where this characteristic is the most pronounced, and the lowest (7.9 percent) in the group which displays a nonauthoritarian and democratic orientation.

This table shows the percentage of the votes obtained by the various parties in groups with high, average, and low predisposition to authoritarianism (March 1991—IPS)

Party	(in percent)			Percentage of Entire Electorate
	High	Average	Low	
SPS	49.8	24.4	7.9	26.2
DS	3.2	9.9	23.7	11.5
SPO	0.8	6.2	11.1	6.1
Others	18.7	30.4	35.6	29.1
Uncommitted	27.5	29.0	21.7	27.2

It turned out that those social strata in which the SPS has the most supporters also display high devotion to authoritarian government.

On the eve of the December election, 28 percent of Milosevic's supporters, taking a position on the best form of government, preferred autocracy ("in the government, as well as in the family, seniority must be clear, i.e., there must be one master whom all will obey"); 33 percent, committing themselves to one of the forms of social justice offered, favored the communist type of justice ("the state should guarantee that all in society have the same property and live the same"). In March of this year, only 25.3 percent of supporters of the SPS answered that the role of political parties in political life was favorable, while all of 63.7 percent saw it as negative. The negative assessment of the role of political parties is predominant in precisely those social strata which have an above-average inclination toward the SPS: among retired people (58 percent), housewives (53 percent), and those employed in the socialized sector (50.3 percent). As to whom they think most to blame for the situation in which Serbia finds itself today, only 6 percent of supporters of the SPS find the guilty party in the leadership of Serbia, while all of 94 percent place the greatest blame on external enemies (a conspiracy of the foreign powers), or on enemies within Serbia.

Which even at a symbolic level brings us to what we arrived at in the sphere of bare facts when we examined the age-specific composition of supporters of the present regime: that this is actually a regime that is essentially gerontocratic. The old regime was a typical gerontocracy, because for years there was no politician under age 60 in the ruling elite. The regime today is also gerontocratic, but now age is in its foundations, and that "oldness" is equally true in the biological, cultural, and political contexts. After all, talk like that (the external and internal enemy, a conspiracy, treason) constitutes an iconography which the regime is slowly and involuntarily getting rid of, although in astronomical time these things do not belong to the distant past, in a historical context they sound and appear antediluvian.

The present ruling elite is certainly not gerontocratic in terms of its own age, but, realizing that the firmest support of its incumbency lies precisely in that age group and cultural group, it gladly makes use of those thought patterns, and it gladly evokes its youthful resentment of the West and liberal principles of arranging society, and it undisguisedly tries to represent the needs of that group

as absolute social priorities, although it is just as far from meeting them as it is from solving the problems of other social groups.

It seems that in this light assertions about manipulation as the main weapon in the rule of the SPS become more convincing. If we bear in mind these features of the political culture of that segment of the electorate, then the observation that it is quite easy to manipulate seems even inadequate. That is, it would be hard to say whether the anachronistic nature and low level of the official propaganda derive more from the government's desire to manipulate or from the desire to meet the tastes of its supporters.

But some of the answers to the above-average predisposition of those strata to the SPS must also be sought in the actual social position of those strata, that is, these are social categories which both from the biological and vocational standpoint are unproductive (pensioners, the elderly) or less productive (those employed in the socialized sector), and uncreative or less creative (quite low level of education and older age); they have seen no future for themselves in the changes that were announced on the eve of the election—changes which impose precisely productivity and creativity as the principal conditions for any advancement. Their social position, which in a way is privileged, is bound up precisely with the present state, that is, with its present personnel

In a society where there is economic and political competition, they risk losing that little slice of social power and privileges which they possess, because in terms of age and intellectual and occupational attributes, they are nevertheless inferior to the other participants in competition who are coming along.

#### The Establishment and Disruption of Balance

The reasons for the election victory of the SPS in December 1990 and for its subsequent complete political domination might, then, be sought in the following:

- Social strata which in large part take a conservative attitude toward the coming changes had a predominance in the composition of the electorate
- The incumbent party, thanks to its dominance in the media, won over to itself that segment of the electorate which is opposed to change, and it strengthened the fear of change that already existed in that segment, that conservative bloc has found its own political articulation in only one party (the SPS), by

contrast with other segments of the electorate (committed to change), which has been politically broken up among a few large and a multitude of smaller parties and groups.

- The majority election system has more than doubled that already politically concentrated strength of the status quo.

That is how Serbia's political life fell into a state of charmed balance. The supporters of the status quo are not a majority (they comprise between one-fourth and one-third of the electorate), but their political strength, thanks to their concentration and to the election system, has been multiplied; the high dissatisfaction, which affects all of two-thirds of the electorate, makes the potential for change considerably greater, but in its political expression that potential crumbles and seems to be weaker than the strength of the status quo.

But the heightened tension of wartime and the external political situation is disrupting the balance. The opposite situation from the end of 1990 now seems to be on the horizon: The bloc of supporters of the status quo is disintegrating, and a concentration of forces of protagonists committed to change is prefigured.

Suddenly, that is, the dissatisfied are becoming more numerous, because the prospects of literally every individual have been darkened by the iron curtain that has been drawn around Serbia. The bloc of those who are afraid that they will lose something to change is rapidly being eaten away (for the simple reason that almost everything has already been lost), and there is a split in the SPS itself as the political representative of the status quo, that segment of society committed to change, by contrast, is rallying more and more around a common movement which is also being joined by many important public and national institutions and organizations. Political change, one would say, is becoming inevitable.

But a change in the government can be effected only if the mistakes and naivete in November 1990 and March 1991 are avoided, the political leadership of the movement for change showed at that time that it could not handle the Machiavellian resourcefulness and unscrupulousness of the ruling elite and its leader.

At the same time, we should bear in mind that a change of government is only the beginning, and the main trials come only after that. The rapid pauperization and destructive propaganda over long years have resulted in such a radicalization of the masses that it will be almost impossible to regulate conflicts peacefully and prevent uncontrolled outpourings of anger. Along with everything we have said about the predisposition of a large segment of the electorate to manipulation, to illustrate the assertion just made, we will give another datum, which also comes from the March public opinion survey. Sixty-five percent of the citizens of Serbia believe that this kind of situation would not have come about in the country if the army right at the outset had immediately taken power in its own hands, arrested and convicted the traitors, and restored order in the country. Such attitudes on the part of two-thirds of the electorate are

certainly not the best guarantee that the changes will necessarily go in the direction of peaceful and democratic transformation of society.

#### **Defense Minister on Macedonian Armed Forces**

92B41734 Skopje NOV Makedonija  
in Macedonian 27 Jun 92 p 5

[Interview with Dr. Trajan Gocevski, Macedonian minister of defense by Zoran Petrov, place and date not given. "We Are Not Raising a Big Army"]

[Text] Even by including all of the military conscripts we could not reach a third of the strength that the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] maintained in Macedonia. We are considering the creation of some special units that together with the forces of the MIA [Ministry of Internal Affairs], would be able to support citizens and safeguard actions. I do not want the fact that some 10,000 are returning to our command in Macedonian territory to be used as a political argument.

The head of the Army is a civilian. He is a doctor of economics, specializing in military-economic problems and is especially familiar with military issues. He became minister of the armed forces when these same armed forces were still virtually nonexistent and the JNA ruled unchallenged on Macedonian territory. This proves the sensitive nature of the situation in which Dr. Trajan Gocevski found himself. At that time he was engaged in active discussions with the Yugoslav Army leaders. He participated in the discussions for the transfer of military sites and organized patrols of the border by Macedonian troops. He could be found whenever issues arose within his jurisdiction which was the defense of Macedonia. Always moderate in his statements, he looks at things and views them in a broad context, responding properly even to the most provocative questions and always stressing Macedonian interests at a time when Macedonia most urgently needs precisely this type of internal unity, peace, and security.

[Petrov] When you were appointed minister of the armed forces, ARM [Arms of the Republic of Macedonia] had not yet been established. What is your view of the withdrawal of the JNA from the Republic, and which officer cadre were you relying on at that time?

[Gocevski] At the time I accepted that position, a number of issues were not clear. Let me tell you, I hesitated greatly on the matter of this entire issue of organizing a defense system for the Republic of Macedonia under circumstances of the presence of the Yugoslav Army as a strong force. On the other hand, there was no legal regulation whatsoever on establishing an autonomous defense system. This meant that whatever we could have done could have qualified as a paramilitary formation, which would unquestionably have triggered a military action. Considering that the Republic was being established as a sovereign state for the first time in history, this was a major challenge for me and an indication that my work would not be easy. I can say that thanks to some fortunate circumstances, we were able to complete our work, which should have taken years, in 100 days. We tackled several projects on a parallel basis, such as discussions with the Army and drafting legal regulations, so that when the Yugoslav

Army was to withdraw from the border, no one would have to test whether we were capable of assuming control of the border. We were able to accomplish this with the help of the reserve TO [Territorial Defense] units. Furthermore, at the same time, we regrouped with a view to training the active personnel, despite exceptionally difficult conditions and circumstances relative to Macedonian security. We dared not make a mistake anywhere because all of our steps were being closely watched, and a pretext for conflict was being sought. The most difficult period in our work was resolved by the resolution of the president of the Republic to set up a general staff for ARM because our ministry was just one more governmental authority like any other, which now also had to develop an armed structure and, at the same time, lacked the necessary people for this. Let me stress that I have great respect for the attitude of a large number of officers who were in the armed forces, starting with those who were members of the command staff of the then operating Third Army District, above all General Arsovski and his associates. They immediately put themselves at the disposal of the ministry and cooperated with us, and it was with their help that we accomplished a number of complex projects.

[Petrov] Were there any problems at that time with the leadership of the JNA in Macedonia, particularly following your initial statement as a minister to the effect that Macedonia would oppose the Army's taking over the weapons of the TO, and did you have any closed-door discussions with the then commander of the Third Military District?

[Gocevski] We held a number of discussions, and some were behind closed doors. It is also true that we had quite constructive discussions with General Uzelac, who made a great contribution to us in the sense that the Army withdrew without serious incidents. However, this was not the case with the entire team surrounding him, and we were often severely tempted to react to some of the actions taken by his associates, which would inevitably have led to a clash. It is accurate that, in the course of the withdrawal of the JNA, we received a number of threats. However, our public statements were such as to defuse the situation. For example, in the course of the talks, after we stressed that we would not discuss the matter of the weapons of the TO inasmuch as they were ours, efforts were still made on several occasions to take those weapons away. Luckily, everyone eventually realized that there were no arguments in favor of removing the weapons of the Macedonian TO. The situation concerning the airport was also rather sticky, particularly when we stated clearly that we would not allow the airport to be disabled for civilian flights. The same prevailed in pulling the convoy out of the airport barracks, when the military authorities issued us an ultimatum to the effect that, if the column were stopped even once, some targets would find themselves under attack.

[Petrov] Several times, both President Gligorov and you mentioned that ARM's priority task is to protect the

borders of Macedonia. Does this mean you will organize border troops, or will the Army assume other such basic objectives and tasks?

[Gocevski] We opted in favor of a defense system that basically observed the overall human and material prerequisites and is organized to perform defense functions. In that sense, as has been repeatedly stated publicly, we favor a contemporary option in the solution of the defense system as an entity. This means that we rely on three basic structures: civil defense, the armed forces of ARM, and our becoming part of the collective security systems of Europe. This means that ARM is only a single segment of the overall defense system and is structured as a single armed force, not as a border unit. I do not know of any army that could operate exclusively as a border force, and this is a compact body whose tasks, in addition to borders, are to protect the territorial integrity of Macedonia, which is quite a difficult function. This also includes defending the airspace and water boundaries. Actually, the Army's constitutional task is to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our state, and not just its borders.

[Petrov] What kind of armaments does ARM have? Is MO [Ministry of Defense] holding talks for military assistance, and is it in touch with the former JNA concerning the forthcoming division of property, or, more specifically, will ARM have military aircraft?

[Gocevski] The public knows that we currently have a certain amount of light infantry arms, which are those we have been using for our territorial defense. So far, we have no aircraft, armor, or missiles. We are obviously thinking of acquiring more equipment, which does not mean that we intend to create a cumbersome and heavily armed force. Therefore, we chose the strategy of peace in resolving the main issues, rather than creating some kind of regional force that might annoy someone. It is with these limits that we shall continue to equip ARM and give more intensive thought to mass antitank and anti-aircraft weapons. Today there are efficient weapons that are easy for one person to handle. We plan to acquire aircraft in the future, but that would consist of helicopters of different types and for special purposes because we do not have enough space for any kind of supersonic aircraft. We are also short of transportation facilities, but we are currently at the stage of formulating a comprehensive plan that must be consistent with the Republic's material possibilities. As announced publicly, our president has already asked the European Community about the division of property, and we have already set up a special commission for this. It is my assumption that we shall acquire some facilities, but, at this stage, we cannot determine which because the game currently being played is quite dishonest. It is no secret that some of the weapons that belonged to the former JNA were removed, and a great many of them are steadily being destroyed in the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia-Heregovina. It may very easily happen that, in the final account, nothing will have been obtained.

[Petrov] You recently said that ARM is planning to set up a professional unit for special antiterrorist and anti-sabotage actions. Could you be more specific?

[Gocevski] I am unaware of the interpretation given to my statement, but any army, including ours, must have units for different purposes. We have already set up one unit with the specific task of protecting projects and individuals, our brigade of guards. Our area and our surroundings, as well as the current political and security situation, make us exceptionally vulnerable to penetration by a variety of sabotage, terrorist, and black-marketing groups, so that must also be taken into account. We are considering the creation of some units that, together with the MVR, would be able to counter such activities. As to professionalism, this is an intrinsic part of the Law on Defense, which calls for contractual arrangements with some of the military personnel, naturally, when material possibilities make this possible. This means that these will be professionally equipped soldiers armed with specific and expensive equipment. However, let me repeat that this is still in the planning stage.

[Petrov] Increasingly, however, the mass media and the public are raising the question of privileges granted to the present corps of ARM officers, who frequently mention the benefits granted during their service in the JNA. Several days ago, your ministry was even forced to issue a statement to the media noting the objective and tendentious information provided to ARM. Do you have any specific remarks?

[Gocevski] Of late, the media have provided information that I believe to be inconsistent with the truth. In principle, I never accuse the information media because the newsmen write about what they learn, or on the basis of information they receive. To begin with, I or, in general, the ministry or the general staff can assume responsibility for some things that were done during the existence of the JNA and its leadership—shall we say, under Branko Mamula. During the four to five months I have been in the ministry, I guarantee that we have neither closed down housing nor sold military property. That property must be inventoried and recorded, and all the transactions related to it must be orderly. The government must make a statement on the subject, and there have also been requests for passing a Law on Army Property. It is not my duty as a minister to trade in Army property. There have been some claims made public that have created problems for us, and I am not shunning priority tasks. Thus, instead of enabling the young recruits to protect the borders more successfully and to make preparations for the new recruits who will come soon, and in a situation in which we have only a few months to engage in such extensive and complex difficulties, this kind of request, which ignores the information provided by the Ministry of Defense, can only complicate relations and the existing situation.

Let me say in this regard that I immediately called for setting up a commission because a number of names had already been made public. The commission's task is to

check all of these statements, and, if anyone has made a mistake, rest assured, he will be held responsible for it. I believe that, when we are working in a specific area such as defense or security, under conditions in which the recognition of Macedonia has still not taken place, one must act particularly cautiously because the impression has been created that there have been some dirty deals, and this, you can rest assured, is very damaging to the state.

In such circumstances, it is very detrimental to speak of any specific privileges or special rights granted to the officers because we are still short about a hundred laws dealing with the status of military personnel. Take housing, for instance. The regulation on housing was based on the former federal criteria, and, until new regulations are passed, the old ones will have to be applied. Therefore, this is simply not the time to provide any privileges to anyone. According to the "rules of the game" of the old JNA, army commanders are granted cottages and separate housing. For security as well as other reasons, we must determine the housing arrangements for the chief of the General Staff. He now lives in temporary housing, and this is a very unpleasant situation. He should be the first to have privileges and facilities dealt with in all such discussions. We must look at the situation realistically and then make decisions.

[Petrov] Does ARM intend to "fill the shoes" of the JNA?

[Gocevski] We are still at the stage of structuring our Army and have not yet reached the minimum number of people needed to protect the borders. So far, we have had only one class of recruits, and, over the course of a single calendar year, we must have five contingents. In other words, even if we combine all of the recruited forces, we would not reach even one-third of the forces the JNA maintained in Macedonia. Could we claim that we are currently raising some kind of huge army? As to the number of people in uniform, concerning the idea that we have a large number of officer cadres, let me tell you that, while the Yugoslav Army was in Macedonia, it numbered more than 2,000 officers. Whether we have a large or an insufficient number of officers will be determined by the military structure on which we are currently working. In theory, this would take between one and two years. Furthermore, in addition to the officers and civilians who worked for the JNA, we shall also include the territorial defense forces of Macedonia, which would include our ministry.

[Petrov] According to MVR information published in the press, some units are still commanded in the Serbo-Croatian language, and some officers are refusing to put the identification patches on their uniforms that identify them as belonging to the Republic of Macedonia. Is that accurate?

[Gocevski] I cannot comment on the origins of such information. It is a fact, however, that I read that in some newspapers. Let me repeat that, in our current transitional period, we are experiencing an exceptionally

delicate situation, particularly with the uniforms, the patches and, to some extent, the command personnel. The problem of uniforms in terms of materiel is normal. It takes time, and we are already in the concluding stage of such activities. Therefore, we shall soon undertake to make original uniforms for the Macedonian troops. As to the insignia, I have already issued a regulation applicable to the transitional phase, with a provisional insignia of the uniforms that includes the Macedonian flag. Bearing in mind that so far the symbols of the state have not been determined, I believe that this is the most practical and least expensive way of providing our Army with insignia because, by law, we must include the seal and the Macedonian flag in the insignia. On the other hand, you know that officers have more than one uniform, and some of the uniforms may not have the proper patches on the sleeves. I do not accept the fact that this may be for some ideological reason. The same situation prevails with the command. The reality is that we are now working with officers who have served in the JNA for 10, 20, or more years, and who had also been assigned to serve in other republics. It is normal, and I can understand that some people make a mistake in issuing commands in Serbo-Croatian rather than in Macedonian. This is not something that happens frequently, nor is it done systematically enough for us to seek a political reason for it.

[Petrov] Is Minister Gocevski satisfied with the public treatment of the Ministry of ARM in terms of the remarks and suggestions he has received?

[Gocevski] What I would like most is to have an objective view of our social situation as a specific specialized authority that is different from the other structures. I would also like for all of the obstacles that are constantly being put in our way, including some dealing with the

most petty matters, to be removed because they only drag us down and complicate the priority tasks and purpose of the Ministry and ARM.

**[Box, p 13]**

**We Have No Arguments With the Police**

The Ministry of Defense is not quarreling with anyone, especially with the MVR, with which we have so far collaborated absolutely correctly. The problem is that the MVR has a number of housing problems, but that applies equally to us and to all of the other ministries. You know there was a mass occupancy of abandoned military housing, not only by MVR personnel but also by many other citizens. In this area, the problem is clear because, as a ministry, we have no right to grant housing to anyone because this housing was built exclusively from contributions from the personal income of the military. On the other hand, the government has already issued a resolution according to which the entire property is granted to the Ministry of Defense. This includes the stipulation that, after inventory has been taken and the military property recorded, any surplus will be disposed of by the government. At this point and with such a short amount of time, we are unable to determine which projects we need and which could be considered surplus. Considering the specific nature of the operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which are in many ways similar and organically related to our own objectives, tasks, and functions, we have already reached an agreement with the government that approximately 110 military housing projects that are under construction will be conceded to the MVR. Therefore, wherever anything can be done, it will be done. However, housing transfers must be determined by the proper authorities, the government, or the assembly.

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